

Circular Migrants: Development or Kleenex Class?

How migrants themselves are structurally missing in policy design for
African-European temporary labour migration



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To my mind, development is about giving hope to ordinary people that their children will live in a society that has caught up with the rest of the world. Take that hope away and the smart people will use their energies not to develop their society but to escape from it. –Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion¹

¹ Collier 2007: 12

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1 Introduction

Last year at least a thousand people died while trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Africa to Europe.² Without increasing European border restrictions this would have been a much lower number. These deaths can be considered as ‘collateral damage’ from border policies. This thesis scrutinizes an alternative to forcefully closed borders. It is asked whether specific migration programmes can take away some of the tension by literally offering other routes towards development. Can in the longer run reducing some of the huge economic differences decrease the need to go? Or is this question to begin with biased by ‘Western’ development thinking from which the roots can be traced back to colonial times? Can the development of ‘poor’ African areas relative to ‘rich’ Western–Europe be stimulated by tailored migration programmes? Can in particular Circular Migration, a specific kind of migration policy programmes, stimulate development?

Circular migration (CM) is a term that quite recently has been used a lot in international migration research and policy making. It amounts to regulated repeated temporary labour migration and is often presented as a ‘triple-win’ solution to problems with migration, labour markets and development. The ‘triple-win’ suggest that home countries, host countries and migrants themselves all benefit. It is typically argued³ that as home countries benefit from remittances (money sent home) and transferred knowledge, CM induces development. This research questions this premise after defining the concepts of circular migration and development within a theoretical reference frame consisting of theories on migration, development and complex systems.

Migration itself is nothing new. We are often told we live in an age of unprecedented mobility. This is not entirely true. Humanity has always been living under conditions of mobility. Perhaps the way mobility is experienced in our social context is different now, as communication and travel are much easier than they used to be. But people do not move more than hundred years ago.⁴ Still, since global population grew and diversity of mobility has increased, “more people are moving in more ways than ever before”.⁵ This means that not moving (nor mixing of cultures) is new, but the magnitude in absolute numbers, and the “diversity of migrants and migrants’ destinations”.⁶ Globalization so far facilitates free flows of capital, goods and information, but for people freedom to move is very selectively expanded and restricted. Still people move. As a result the social fabric, fuelled by globalization, is becoming increasingly transnational.⁷ As global inequality seems to cause more migration, the links between migration and development increasingly receive

² <http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/> on January 7, 2010; This International NGO has compiled a list of deaths related to European border policies, based on press reporting.

³ OECD (2007a), UN (2009), OECD (2007), Vertovec (2007)

⁴ See 2.1.2 for a discussion and sources.

⁵ Skeldon 1997: 4

⁶ Bakewell 2008: 6

⁷ UN 2006: 7

attention in the international migration debate.⁸ Circular migration is a relatively new but quickly embraced concept in migration policy discourse,⁹ and it is broadly linked to development.

To reduce the scope of this research, development will be considered in the African–European context. Chapter 2 will introduce the concepts of international migration and development, working towards a framework for assessing their relationship. Can circular migration be connected to development indeed? Or is it a new brand of institutionalized dependency, perhaps even in some of its forms a 21st century slavery that shackles people by making them dependent on strictly enforced programmes offering much-wanted corridors through even stricter enforced international borders?¹⁰ The closing borders in the African–European migration system have unwanted side effects like human trafficking, casualties and other violations of human rights. These side-effects are often neglected.

In thinking and theorizing on international migration, two important shifts are taking place. First, the field seems to be increasingly recognizing the *simple move myth*¹¹; contrary to what has generally been believed, patterns of movement in human lives seldom follow simple patterns of single moves. People engage in complicated and multiple acts of migration that are better described as *human mobility*. Second, and related to the first shift, is the recognition of complexity that hinders causal analysis of large international migration systems. Whether paradigmatic or not, this shift has consequences for the ontology of migration theory. Both shifts are explained in chapter 3. They lead to a rephrasing of the principal question whether circular migration is beneficial to development. Defining causal relations in complex systems will prove to be problematic. As a result, the main questions will be *what is the relationship between circular migration and development*, and *what are consequences for policymaking?*

A simple discourse analysis of policy papers and a comparative case study will be the research methods applied next. In chapter 4 circular migration as practice and as a concept in policy making are analysed, building on post World War II cases from Canada, Mexico, the US, Germany and North Africa. Beginning from existing research, an assessment of policy documents from the national, regional and global levels will result in a working definition for circular migration. From this working definition five cases are then selected and scrutinized. North African regions will be included in this selection. This analysis will provide a ‘reality check’ for the analysis of the relationship between circular migration and development in chapter 5, leading towards policy recommendations and more general conclusions in the final chapter.

⁸ And the reverse: migration is receiving attention in the development debate. The influential UN Human Development Report 2009 focuses on migration and development.

⁹ See all policy documents discussed in chapter 4.

¹⁰ Although this seems a harsh statement, contract labour as the large majority of circular migrants engage in is “seen as a form of ‘unfree’ labour” (Cohen 1987, Miles 1987, in Skeldon 1997: 151). See also 4.5.

¹¹ Skeldon: 1997: 2, 9. OECD 2007a: 15

In the course of the analysis an assessment framework will be developed. This framework will consist of a list of properties for an 'ideal' programme with the potential to stimulate development. Finally, while the communication revolution does facilitate contact with 'home', the author still asks some ethical questions like what it means for a society if people only speak to their kids through telephones and the internet for the best part of their young lives? The psychology of (circular) migration, a subject seldom touched in the literature, will thus be granted some attention throughout all chapters.

To illustrate some of the individual perspectives and psychological implications of mobility, each chapter starts with a short migrant's story. In February and March 2009 the author has visited a number of African migrants both in Europe and in Africa. Their stories are by no means representative. Even more, it might be that arguments derived from their stories are biased by 'cherry picking'; finding arguments that support a theory. The interviews were conducted with the goals of research as well as to make a documentary. It was therefore not easy to find people who wanted to tell their stories because a camera had to be running, and it is to be expected that the interviewees have held back because they knew their stories could end up in a movie for a European audience. Still the stories can provide a worthwhile complement. They show some migrants' perspectives, and as will be argued this is the only way to make sense of the complexity of a migration system. A crucial recommendation is that interviews like these should be conducted on a much larger scale to serve as a basis for policy development.

This thesis has been written in a world with migrants to start with, employers and policy makers, civil society organizations often in both sending and receiving countries, plus supranational policy organizations at the European and global levels. Using analyses like in this paper, policy makers propose policies that politicians then sell to their electorates and negotiate with their colleagues. For the migrants involved it can only be hoped that all different stakes and power positions will interact to their well being. Perhaps this thesis helps this process a small step further.

Omar Parfait

The first time, dolphins accompanied his boat. Parfait lives in Africa. For now he has settled in Nouadhibou, a fishers village at the Mauritanian coast. Just before his third attempt to get to Spain, his father had warned him. He told him he had seen drowned migrants in the media, and that God had given him the message that Parfait shouldn't go. All hundred thirty passengers of the smugglers' boat he did not take did disappear.

So now he lives in Nouadhibou. But like many Africans in Europe he lives over two thousand kilometres from his family, that stayed behind in Cameroon. He smiles a lot. In Nouadhibou he is able to work as a construction engineer. He works at the harbour, where still now and then the wooden *pirogues* leave for the Canary Islands.

His brother lives in Paris. Parfait shows his picture, and pictures of his children and his wife. When asked about his ideas for the future of his kids, he only responds that every two months he can send them some money. But in his small house, the pictures of his kids are the only thing standing out. He lives alone in his small room, with his mattress and a television set. His dream was to reach Europe. A legal route was impossible for him to find. He has travelled all of West-



Africa before reaching Nouadhibou. His journey went from Cameroon to Chad, Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Algeria, back to Mali, from where he reached Nouadhibou in 2005. It seems to be a typical journey, again showing the fluid nature of human mobility.

Parfait now has heard some stories from Africans in Europe. In general they tell them that life is very hard, and that once they lived in Europe the large majority wants to return but does not dare to. It seems that Parfait as well is reluctant to return after failing. His persistence to go was very strong. Only after three attempts with the last one ending in a massacre he decided to stay – for now.

2 Migration and Development – moving towards mobility as *condition humaine*

When I went to France... We are talking about... the year 2009. When I was there it was 2008. And a man stood up. And you know what he told me? He said: The Africans you work, you have land, you have hoes, You should plant potatoes. And I looked at him and I laughed! I said: What are you saying? Do you know what you are saying? The Africans are working, we are planting potatoes, but we are not talking about potatoes. People are talking about going into the moons, and Mars. And you are talking about using cutlers and hoes... What do you think? What do you think?!¹²

2.1 How mobility has suddenly entered the development debate and why this is a huge positive change

Any change is a change in the topic. –César Aira, Argentine novelist, Cumpleaños, 2001, in Naomi Klein (2007)

What's the difference between migration and mobility, and why does it matter? The main difference is that migration has long been associated with a simple one-way move, while mobility refers to the universal human practice of spatial change, in aggregate a complex system of short-term, long-term, short-distance and long-distance movement. As such human mobility is the ongoing practice of migration. Mobility is believed to be a more appropriate concept than migration for describing human movement.¹³ Still the term 'migration' will be used in this paper as well, because most theory is developed around it.

In migration literature there is a remarkable discourse transformation going on, where 'migration' is being replaced by 'mobility'. This change marks a broader change and can indeed be considered to be part of a next step in a process of decolonization, or at least a post-colonial revision of the development debate.

How has it happened that in Western societies migration has always been an accepted feature of development, while in development thinking about African societies it is still considered a malfunction of society? In the nineteenth century, as we will see, massive out-migration towards the 'new world' has occurred. This new world was not uninhabited. Furthermore the industrial revolution has led to large-scale urbanisation. In Western countries development processes have also coincided

¹² Jérôme Dukia, interviewed for documentary on 17 February 2009, Nouadhibou, Mauritania.

¹³ Skeldon 1997: 2 and OECD 2007a which is a report on "Gaining from Migration" which has been built on the concept of mobility systems.

with huge rural–urban and international migration.¹⁴ Why does development thinking and practice consider these phenomena as undesirable?

“Mobility is still excluded from the underlying model of development,” Oliver Bakewell (2008: 10) wrote. Bakewell argues how the African “development project” has been rooted in the “colonial concern about the control of mobility”.¹⁵ Put bluntly, slave–trade and cheap labour have been a main interests of the colonial powers, making migration control a major concern for them. To this day, this concern still echoes in development practice; many projects have implicit or explicit goals of ‘keeping them in place’.¹⁶ The recent attention for the impact of migration on development has not yet changed this significantly. The rationale of migration–for–development thinking is, as we will see, predominantly based on the idea that migration will eventually stop when home countries are far enough developed. This may be the case, but Bakewell points out that this line of thinking is paternalistic and nationalistic; it tells people what to do and where to live. It is hypocritical because it imposes an “idea of the good life”¹⁷ on other people that for Western people works the other way around; it is considered to be an achievement if one has freedom to travel and can live where one desires.¹⁸ Why should African people not at least *want to* enjoy these same freedoms?

Following Bakewell (2008) these ‘inconvenient questions’ must be addressed if migration is brought into the development equation. The ‘move into mobility’ can facilitate this change by stressing the idea that moving is more rule than exception, is indeed a general feature of the human condition. The implications are not only that ‘we’ should allow ‘them’ to strive for freedom of movement. It leads to the inevitable conclusion that research can not exclusively look at social transformations in developing countries. As mobility is a universal human feature, “the task for scholars is then to understand the complex relationship between migration and social transformations. This then raises questions like how mobility affects changes for better and worse in *any society*, rather than discussing it as an exceptional problem for Africa. This might make it easier to avoid the assumption that mobility is normal for the wealthy, international elite, but a symptom of failure among the poor.”¹⁹ The next section will show how mobility became a universal feature of the human condition.

¹⁴ Bakewell 2008: 12

¹⁵ Bakewell 2008: 2

¹⁶ Bakewell 2008: 14

¹⁷ Bakewell 2008: 10

¹⁸ See for example ‘The art of Travel’ by Alain de Botton (2002). Another example might be that European countries have policy programmes enabling students to spend some time abroad, and other legislation enabling Europeans to work in other European countries.

¹⁹ Bakewell 2008: 15 (emphasis by this author)

2.1.1 Brief History of International Migration

Tension, induced by a historically unprecedented global inequality, characterises global migration.²⁰ Before reaching this conclusion, a brief history will be sketched.

People have been moving throughout history. Interestingly in the context of the issue of global inequality and development, migration started from the African continent.²¹ Hunter-gatherers spent their entire lives moving in search for food and shelter. As populations grew, more food was needed and eventually techniques for food production were invented. This would enable settlement in regions with harsher climates, where food was not to be found year-round, and where more solid types of shelter were a prerequisite to stay alive. Eurasia²² proved to provide fertile ground with unique biodiversity. According to Diamond (1997) this happened because the Eurasian continent provides a large *horizontally* laid out land area with comparatively stable climate. On this large landmass a sufficient variety of plants and animals had developed to be domesticated. As food production rose more people could spend their time inventing, and civilization established.

As Diamond (1997) argues, the first great wave of colonialism occurred when the Americas were 'discovered' by Europeans. It was mainly because of the germs they carried that they were so successful in taking over the continents, as they basically just had to wait for illnesses to spread; Europeans themselves were obviously immune, having been exposed to these illnesses that had developed in their domestic animals for much longer. This marks what Massey *et al.* (1998) describe as the first period of modern migration. Agrarian settlers and plantation entrepreneurs settled under economic conditions of mercantilist capitalism. The need for cheap labour was being fulfilled by 'forced migration' of African slaves. Nearly 10 million African slaves would be employed in the Americas over three centuries to follow.²³

Industrialization spurred and enabled a grand exodus from Europe towards the New World in roughly the 19th century, involving about 48 million people,²⁴ making it the "largest population replacement of the last 13,000 years".²⁵ With the outbreak of World War One this virtually halted. Between the World Wars immigration laws were tightening, the great depression froze migration as well, and the Second World War mainly led to refugee migration. The last or post-industrial period has seen a remarkable reversal. Where until 1925 African slaves and European settlers dominated global migration flows, from the 1960s on Europe starts receiving migrants and on the whole diversity and complexity become main features of the global migration system. This paper focuses on circular migration as a phenomenon

²⁰ See 3.2 for a discussion of Massey (1998)

²¹ An interesting vision on this can be found in Diamond 1997: 37. In a way, the recent exodus of African natives, as slaves or recently as (knowledge) workers, is ancient history repeating.

²² The combined continents of Europe and Asia.

²³ Massley *et. al.* 1998: 1. Massley divides modern migration into four periods that are adopted here.

²⁴ Massley *et al* 1998: 2

²⁵ Diamond 1997: 354

in this last period. A summary of the breakdown in periods of migration can be found in Table 1.

Table 1 – Periods of Migration

1. Mercantile 1500–1800	2. Industrial 1800–1925	3. Stagnation 1925–1960	4. Post-industrial 1960–
African slave trade	Exodus to New World	Great Depression	Reversal and complexity

Source: Massey et al. (1998)

Fascinating is the question why the at that time incredibly successful Chinese empire did not expand in the period preceding European domination. David Landes (1997), in his thorough exploration of the question why some countries became rich while others stayed behind, notes how for mainly cultural reasons the Chinese, while having a substantial fleet in the 1400s, decided to halt all seafaring activities in the sixteenth century.²⁶ Until then the fleet had not returned with anything of particular importance, while the costs of exploration were high. As a result, in 1500 anyone building a ship with more than two masts was waiting a death penalty, and by 1550 it became a criminal act to go to sea on a ship with more than one mast. Landes explains the abandonment of exploration from feelings of superiority and resulting lack of curiosity.²⁷ Whatever the explanation, the obvious result was that the Chinese economy stayed on its own, at about the same moment the European economies started making global connections through seafaring routes.

Explanations for the historical movements of people can thus be found in economic (search for food, slave trade, and land; colonialism, settlement), cultural (why the Chinese did *not* move) and political (war, safety) reasons; climate related circumstances are linked to search for food and safety. The general conclusion from this brief history is that people have often moved in order to survive. In further exploring explanations, next some general features of the international migration system will be presented.

2.1.2 General features of international migration

When investigating global migration systems²⁸, what stands out is a lack of data. Most numerical analysis is based on a not very fortunate denominator for the number of foreign born people in a country: migrant stock.²⁹ There is some global data on migrant stocks,³⁰ although it is fiercely limited by the difficulties of accounting for

²⁶ Landes 1997: 96

²⁷ It can be questioned whether the decision to halt seafaring activities should be attributed mainly to cultural reasons. These reasons are hard to measure or prove.

²⁸ See for a discussion on systems approach chapter 3.

²⁹ The Oxford American Dictionary relates stock mainly to piles of goods and merchandise, financial assets or farm animals.

³⁰ Data on migration stock has been gathered by most notably the United Nations (see UN (2006) and GCIM (2005), and the OECD (see Source OECD at <http://www.sourceoecd.org/>)

irregular migration.³¹ What is more, flow data³² is largely unavailable.³³ Still some general phenomena stand out. First, international migration is *not* increasing in relation to population growth. At the beginning of the 21st century, about 3 million people are estimated to migrate every year; about 0,05 percent of world population. The number of international migrants (global stock) as a proportion of the world's population remains relatively constant through history at around three percent.³⁴ Second, of these three percent, the largest part (around 60%) is living in developed countries, indicating that while 'south-south migration' is omnipresent, increasingly people are moving from 'south' to 'north'.³⁵ This makes for a quite high 8.3% of foreign-born individuals in the EU27 countries.³⁶ Third, as *international* migration remains constant, little still is said about the movement of people on a truly *global* human scale, since both migration within countries and irregular migration are largely not accounted for. Forth, the international system balances at a state of unprecedented inequality in and between countries.

Tension is created because of the "sheer size of the disparities that exist between sending and receiving societies".³⁷ Given the disparities, the "actual size of the migratory flows is really rather modest".³⁸ An implication for (circular) migration policies is, from the policy makers' point of view, they have to be carefully constructed because the system will tend to release its tension in unpredictable and complex ways.³⁹ But how to construct models that deal with complexity and unpredictability? Individual motivations will prove a crucial factor for understanding the complex global migration system.⁴⁰

While there is a general lack of data on migration, especially irregular migration, there are some more specific features of international migration that have accumulated in the literature over time. In 2002 the UN published an International Migration Report. It states that about 9 percent of the then about 175 million migrants in the world are refugees. While the US holds the largest number of

³¹ "The net migration data, however, are subject to caution, because unauthorised movements are not taken into account in the inflows and these are significant in some countries", OECD Factbook 2007 at www.oecd.org.

³² Flow data tells how many people move from one place to the other over a given period of time. It is essential for the description of migration phenomena on a system level.

³³ De Haas 2006a: 77

³⁴ GCIM 2005: 5, UN 2006: 7. Numbers seem to be exaggerated though. The number of registered migrants in proportion to world population at the turn of the last century is counted by the UN Population Division at about 3 percent. One instance of exaggeration happened because after the break-up of the Soviet Union many former 'Russians' came to live in newly created states without moving (UN 2002: 6, footnote). For this reason just after 1989, the percentage was raised with almost one third from 2.2 to 2.9 percent.

³⁵ *ibid*: 6

³⁶ OECD 2007: 27

³⁷ Massey 1998: 7

³⁸ *idem*.

³⁹ Skeldon (1997: 7) questions the validity of the pressure-analogy, as it implies that "pressure will be released once the barriers are moved". This does not fit with observations that migration often leads to more migration.

⁴⁰ See chapter 3.

registered migrants, the country is not even in the top twenty of countries with most migrants as percentage of their population (see Figure 1, Figure 2).

In 2002 the UN recognizes the substantial size of remittances but does not yet highlight their strong potential role in development.⁴¹ The legal status of refugees and migrant workers is recognized as being predominantly based on the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol on the status of Refugees and the 1990 Convention with 2000 Protocol on the protection of Migrants and Trafficking in persons.⁴² These legal aspects will be further explained in 2.1.5.


Douglas Massey, before leading the influential project that led to the book “Worlds in Motion – Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium”, formulated a social approach to migration along the following arguments. In his research on Mexicans in the US (Massey 1987: 1373) he stressed the self-perpetuating nature of migration, depicting it as a “dynamic social process with strong internal momentum”. Migration is a social process, he argues, self-perpetuating because of social networks developing over time that facilitate more migration; a process that has become known as cumulative causation. Permanent settlement is an inevitable feature, but in general international migrants have the desire to return to their home countries. Return migration is an important factor in the formation of networks.

Migrant networks are ultimately transnational; they span and bridge national borders. The forming of these networks is a defining feature of international migration systems. In Massey *et alia's* recent (1998) work, this social dimension is, with the economic dimensions, thoroughly theorized and tested. It is concluded that wage differentials are not a primary cause of migration, albeit often a wage gap is present. Main reasons to move are related to risk-control for households in changing societies under forces of globalization. As markets are penetrated and transform, transitional “failures in capital, credit, futures and insurance markets” are the most powerful causes of international migration. In discussing migration theory in chapter 3, these features will be discussed in more detail, specifically with respect to the way the process changes as migration systems change and develop over time.

⁴¹ UN 2002: 5


⁴² *Ibid.*

Figure 1 – Absolute migrant stock



Source: UN (2002) International Migration Report

Figure 2 – Relative migrant stock



Source: UN (2002) International Migration Report

Prejudices about international migration are omnipresent. Hein de Haas (2005) puts some 'myths' into perspective, arguing that poverty and misery are *not* root causes of labour migration,⁴³ and with a range of arguments, that international migration has proven almost impossible to stop. As the cases considered in chapter 4

⁴³ DeHaas 2005: 1271

will show, closing borders paradoxically will hardly stop migration, but cause even more people to settle permanently.⁴⁴ Certainly once migration has taken off, cumulative causation effects based on migrants' networks make managing migration increasingly difficult. A complicating factor is an omnipresent tension between migration control and human rights, which will prove to be often neglected in recent policies on circular migration.⁴⁵

Finally, observing the basic elements of every migration system –migrants– two things stand out. First, migrants come in all sorts and colours; it is virtually impossible to give general characteristics of who 'the migrant' is. Second, one exception to the first observation: young adults are more likely to move than children or older people. It has been observed that population changes are reflected in migration changes just 25 years later.⁴⁶

2.1.3 Terms and definitions

A list of some of the most important terms and definitions related to international migration can be found in Appendix A. All definitions are simplifications and do not reflect a value free interpretation of reality. Others have changed as the historical context changes. Some have been strongly politicized.

Politically charged is the term illegal/irregular migrant. While the term 'illegal' has become a common popular name for a person living in a country without residence permits, it is not in all European countries considered to be a crime to do so. The debate is ongoing, with as an example Italy where only in August 2009 criminal laws were adopted as to make people without residence permits actually guilty of a criminal act. In the Netherlands, comparable legislation was proposed in 2002 but was not effectuated because the government fell at that time. A related politicized aspect is in the difference between illegal and irregular. NGOs have been campaigning against the use of the word 'illegal' because it depicts migrants as criminals beforehand. Irregular and undocumented are more value-free and are in this study adopted as a denominator for migrants without papers, just like the in French widely used *sans papiers*.

Most of the other terms are adopted from sources like UN resolutions. Perhaps quite controversial would be the definition of development: The social and political economic process of societal change in which people's capabilities grow as they desire, with – if actively pursued like in policy making – the goal to provide a fair minimum level of human security. The rationale for the use of this definition is explained in the second part of this chapter (2.2).

⁴⁴ Ibid.: 1278

⁴⁵ See 4.5

⁴⁶ Massey (1998)

2.1.4 Psychology of migration

The psychology of migration is seldom touched upon. It is lacking in the review of mainstream migration theory in the next chapter,⁴⁷ because the great majority of all studies does not touch the subject. This is problematic when migrants are considered as agents with free will and opportunities. Understanding the psychology of acts of migration would make it probably easier to predict their moves and interact with them in the development of policies.

This study also is not an investigation into the psychology of migration. Scientific specialization renders it difficult for a political scientist to make a sound psychological analysis. In the following chapters it will be argued that as migration happens in complex systems, individual perceptions and motivations have to play a more substantial role in theorizing about migration. For this reason, it will be advised that research teams should be more diverse and include psychologists and/or anthropologists.

A certainly non-exhaustive review of literature on the psychology of migration revealed a small body of research into the effects of migration on the human psyche. Anthropologists Rapport and Dawson (1998: 4) consider identity as a physical or cognitive search. They observe how identity⁴⁸ is linked with time (identification with generations) *and* space (where one lives), and how changes of time and place influence identity.

'Home' partly defines identity. Rapport and Dawson argue that the notion of home changes with levels of mobility and that this change must be understood in order to understand modern migration. "A far more mobile conception of home"⁴⁹ is called for. Home essentially changes from meaning merely 'house' into "a routine set of practices, [...] styles of dress and address, in memories and myths, in stories carried around in one's head."⁵⁰

Hope, shame, expectations and curiosity are other concepts found more with psychology than with political sciences. Still this author believes they can play a crucial role for understanding migrants. For example Elkan (1967) has shown, as described in chapter 4.3.5, how migration in African countries is often part of initiation rites, a literal *rite de passage* for coming of age. The meaning of those rites is hard to grasp without some psychological understanding of hope, shame and expectations.⁵¹

It is striking how explanations from psychology are missing in migration theory. It can change moral questions into practical ones, like in the case of the question when family separation could lead to social damage. Some interviews described in this thesis indicate that shame can play a major role in preventing migrants to

⁴⁷ Paragraph 3.2.1

⁴⁸ Considered as the ideas and beliefs one has about oneself

⁴⁹ Berger 1984:64 cited in Rapport and Dawson (1998)

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ All to be considered within specific and differing cultural traditions.

return.⁵² Especially regarding the political and social difficulties of *non-return*, understanding this shame could help to understand migration and improve migration policies.

Finally feelings of hope could prove crucial for development, as voiced by Paul Collier.⁵³ He writes that in his opinion “development is about giving hope to ordinary people that their children will live in a society that has caught up with the rest of the world. Take that hope away and the smart people will use their energies not to develop their society but to escape from it.”

2.1.5 Legal aspects of migration – layers of justice

A juridical foundation for migration policy must be understood on national, regional and international levels.

The level of international law is most universal but least enforced. Sources of international law include UN resolutions and customary law, but the enforcement relies entirely on ‘soft’ power exercised through diplomacy and mechanisms like *retorsions*.⁵⁴ Foundations for migration law are the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention (supplemented through the 1967 Protocol), which makes the principle distinction between migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. International legislation on migrants in general is established with the 1990 Convention (with 2000 Protocol) on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of the Families. “It formalizes the responsibility of receiving States in regard to upholding the rights of migrants and assuring their protection.”⁵⁵ It entered into force in 1993. On the intended effects of these documents, the UN (2002) write:

“The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, ratified by 141 countries, establishes legal protections and a clear definition of the status of refugees. It also prohibits the expulsion or forcible return of persons accorded refugee status. The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ratified by 139 countries, extends the scope of the 1951 Convention, which benefited only persons who became refugees prior to 1 January 1951. It also extends the application of the Convention to persons who became refugees after that date.”

“The 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, ratified by 19 countries, establishes an international definition of the different categories of migrant workers. [...] The 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, ratified by 18 countries, aims to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, particularly women and children; to protect and assist the victims of such trafficking; and to promote cooperation among States parties to meet these objectives.

⁵² See the interview with Djiby Diop on page 88.

⁵³ Collier 2007: 12

⁵⁴ Kooijmans 2002: 145

⁵⁵ UN (2002)

Finally, the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, ratified by 17 countries, aims to combat and prevent the smuggling of human cargo, reaffirming that migration in itself is not a crime, and that migrants may be victims in need of protection.”

The 1951 Refugee Convention is mainly relevant for migration policy and legislation because its use is considered by migrants as an option to enter Europe. Juridically, a distinction between migrant and refugee can only be made after a person has applied for asylum and his or her case is passed. The 1990 Convention is a step in the establishment of international law, because it underlines that migration as such can not be considered a crime, and it recognises that migrants may be victims of circumstances.⁵⁶ But again mechanisms for enforcement of these treaties are scarce and rest on the willingness of member states. Another problem is the limited number of signatory states. Of the 42 states that ratified the 1990 Convention as of December 2009, almost all are developing nations. Non of the West-European countries has signed nor ratified the treaty. Because of this the legal power of the Convention is very limited. As a result, the real-world effects of the Convention for those who need protection stay far behind. Amnesty International concludes in 2005 that “Greece had, by September 2005, neither signed nor ratified the Convention.”⁵⁷ After Italy has been further closing its borders through a deal with Libya in August 2009, an increasing number of migrants and refugees enters Europe through Greece. ⁵⁸ A stronger power lies with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It has broader acceptance and although not a treaty itself, it is widely accepted as customary international law. Following the declaration, unrestricted migration is not a universal human right. Nevertheless, it grants people the right to change nationality. Also the declaration grants everyone the right to work, form a family and have that family protected. Relevant articles are listed in Box 1.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ <http://www.unesco.org/most/migration/convention/>

⁵⁷ Amnesty 2005: 29

⁵⁸ http://www.nrc.nl/buitenland/article1967236.ece/Italie_investeert_miljarden_in_ex-kolonie_Libie

⁵⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights, (9 December 2009)

Box 1 – Universal Declaration of Human Rights – articles related to migration

On the regional level, the European Union has increasing legislative powers.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including their own, and to return to their country.

Article 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16 (part)

3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Where member states in principle operate from sovereignty, several areas of legislation are outsourced to the European Union, for example in the areas of finance and trade. In spite of this, border control still rests largely with the member states, which can be explained from the defining character borders have on the nation state. States want to control who belong to their constituency and who do not. Still an increasing part of European border legislation is promoted to the European level. Relevant examples are the 1985 Schengen agreement⁶⁰ ensuring free movement of people within Europe's outer borders, and several initiatives on common border control like the establishment of the border agency FRONTEX in 2004.⁶¹

On the African legal situation no scientific research in the English language has been found by this author. Although he is no law expert, it can be seen as an omission in international relations research that no attempts can be found on mapping African law systems regarding to the movement of people within Africa or across the continental borders. The following question would be, how do African

⁶⁰ http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/schengen_agreement_nl.htm (retrieved 9 December 2009)

⁶¹ See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/I33216_nl.htm

countries and migrants value the international legal system? Out of the 42 ratifying signatories to the 1990 Convention, 20 are African countries. This shows that these African governments feel they have something to win by joining the Convention, and have some kind of trust in the power of the international law. On the relation between regional or national African legal systems and the system of international law, research is lacking.

The specific effects of the legal situation introduced in this chapter are hard to assess. As will be argued the complexity of migration systems renders it virtually impossible. For it to have effect on migration processes, the influence of this legislation on individual migration decisions would have to be estimated. Some effects are potentially enforced and revealed through the work of NGOs like Amnesty International, for example through the report cited above on the rights of migrants in Greece.

2.2 What Development?

Gross Net Product measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country. It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. –Robert Kennedy ⁶²

Development is an ambiguous and often politicized concept. The many differing ideas⁶³ of what it could be agree on one point: it describes positive change. The roots of many Western ideas on development can be traced back to colonial history.⁶⁴ Nevertheless different ideas of what development is or should be can be found in literature, of which six major lines of thought will be singled out.

Development and migration meet through the idea of development tiers, a stratification of geographic areas according to their relative stages of development. One of the tiers, the labour frontier, is defined in terms of labour migration and will provide a conceptual space in which circular migration programmes and change in migration systems can be described and analysed. At the end of this chapter on this basis the relationship between migration and development will be scrutinized. But first of all now a very general picture of the general improvements in human lives is sketched, in order to introduce the concrete way of thinking about development in terms of life expectancy and health, and to show the progress that has been made in about the last century. It proves that for many people the hope for a longer and healthier life already has materialised.

2.2.1 Development as health and economic growth – basic facts


Tremendous progress has been made in large parts of the world in terms of human development. The UN Human Development Index (UN 2007) indicates that people can expect to live much longer than ever before (Figure 3).

⁶² Cited in Kamp (2002)

⁶³ An analysis of literature in the context of migration and development: Skeldon 1997: 17.

⁶⁴ As already shown while discussing the recent discourse shift from migration to mobility.


Figure 3 – Global Life Expectancy at Birth



Source: UN (2007) Human Development Report 2007–2008. Numbers are positively biased because data on poorer countries has been relatively unavailable. See also notes to Figure 5.


The fact that people live longer indicates that living circumstances have been and are improving for the large majority. In less than 150 years the life expectancy at birth has doubled on a global level. The global population expands, but not as would be expected from the rising life expectancy. As people expect their children to live longer, fertility rates have been dropping at equally staggering speed. The number of children per woman can be seen to have halved in the past 50 years (Figure 4).

Figure 4 – Global Fertility Rates



Source: UN Data at data.un.org.
(Number of children per woman.)

Figure 5 – Child Mortality Rates



Sources: Unicef at www.childmortality.org,
Human Mortality Database at www.mortality.org.
(Children died before age of 5 per 1000.)⁶⁵

There are other ways of looking at development though. Starting from indicators like life expectancy and fertility does result in a view on people's ability to meet basic needs like food and drinking water, healthcare and shelter. The development of child mortality underlines this point (Figure 5).⁶⁵ Looking at economic indicators like income per person⁶⁶, an equally significant and comparable improvement can be observed. These indicators are less unambiguous. To complicate things, both sets of indicators hide the underlying processes of improving agricultural productivity, fighting diseases, setting up educational systems, broader social and political organization of societies, integration into global trade networks and at the end of the line the perception of the quality of life.

Within this generally optimistic context, the distribution of these improvements is of crucial importance. On the scale of continents, a number of Asian countries have shown tremendous growth in both income per person and life expectancy, especially since the 1990s. Many African countries are lagging behind. It should be observed though, that on an intra-continental scale, differences between countries are substantial⁶⁷, as are differences within countries, within regions and within communities. The global picture has been analysed and visualised in a very accessible way by Swedish social scientist Hans Rosling.⁶⁸


⁶⁵ The outliers that can be observed from the 1960s on reflect how data gathering in many slowly developing countries has started only recently, first in ten year periods and from the 1990s in five year periods. As can be observed, this strongly biases the numbers but in a proportional way; in less and least developing countries child mortality has been decreasing at about the same levels as for the rest of the world.

⁶⁶ Controlled for differing price levels, often expressed in Purchasing Power Parity or PPP

⁶⁷ See for example World Bank (2003)

⁶⁸ www.gapminder.org

Figure 6 - Income and child mortality 1960-2006




Source: www.gapminder.org

As can be observed from Figure 6, where size of the bubbles represents population size and the colour refers to their geographic location, African countries stay increasingly behind while the large majority of other regions are catching up at amazing speeds, both in economic terms as in terms of health improvements.⁶⁹ Global inequality is persistent⁷⁰ but generally decreasing. The number of people living under \$1 is slightly decreasing,⁷¹ and this trend will probably continue,⁷² with again Africa staying behind.

Looking more closely at the African situation, not only differences between countries but also large differences within countries stand out. Namibia, as an extreme example, has its poorest 20 percent living at conditions that are at the lower end of the continent, while the richest 20 percent live close to the OECD circumstances (Figure 7).⁷³ If differences in countries are accounted for, parts of Africa live still longer and richer than large parts of Asia. The gap between OECD countries and African countries though is persistent.

Figure 7 – Intra-country differences in 2003



Various sources, mainly UN, cited on www.gapminder.org. The dots on the country lines represent quintiles.

⁶⁹ Health measured in terms of child mortality.

⁷⁰ The poorest 20% of world population earn 2% of global income, while the richest 20% earn about 75% (UN 2005).

⁷¹ From 1.4 billion 1970 to 1.2 billion in 2000, even with increasing world population.

⁷² UN (2005)

⁷³ With somewhat lower child survival, though.

In recent years, since about the beginning of the 21st century, Africa on average shows remarkable economic growth.⁷⁴ John Page, the World Bank's chief economist for Africa, told the BBC: "For the first time in about almost 30 years we've seen a large number of African countries that have begun to show sustained economic growth at rates that are similar to those in the rest of the developing world and actually today exceed the rate of growth in most of the advanced economies."⁷⁵ Growth is fast (almost 5.4 percent per year), but population growth offsets this so income per capita is still at level that keeps 50 percent of the population under a \$1.00 poverty line. The World Bank considers integration into the world economy the most important factor in Africa's growth. Most of the growth is in oil and other resources. Given the local differences, countries and places lagging behind are becoming isolated pockets of poverty. Paul Collier (2007) has called the approximately one billion people caught in these places of poverty the 'bottom billion'.⁷⁶ The pressing question currently is how Africa's large economic growth will translate in the daily lives of these bottom billion. Due to a lack of historical data it is hard to estimate the development of distribution of intra-country inequality. This dimension will become important in assessing how migration affects development⁷⁷ across levels of aggregation, from the individual and households to countries, continents and finally the global scale.

Next, differing and changing ideas about the concept of development will be discussed starting from the just implicitly used conceptions of development as economic growth and health improvements.

2.2.2 From postcolonial development towards universal freedom

Development is tightly linked to the concept of poverty; those who are 'underdeveloped' often have less than those who are 'rich'. A general danger of using the concepts development and poverty is stigmatization. The idea of developing and developed countries dismisses the reality that *all* countries are involved in processes of development.⁷⁸ The dichotomy between less developed countries and more developed countries could also be considered in terms of capabilities and freedom (passive - freedom from, related to human security - and active - freedom to, for example to move). In this paper an attempt is made to not consider the individuals forming groups of 'poor' or 'underdeveloped' as poor or underdeveloped human beings per se. Poverty is in general a relative concept. But poor people in monetary terms do not have to lead poor lives in social terms or in terms of self-fulfilment or in terms of happiness. Underdeveloped people need not be stupid, ignorant or

⁷⁴ A growth that is hampered by the recent global economic crisis to an extent that still has to be revealed.

⁷⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7093912.stm> on 20 September 2008

⁷⁶ Though most of them are in Africa, part of the bottom billion reside in other places like the Middle East and Asia.

⁷⁷ As we will see, first and foremost through remittances.

⁷⁸ If development is considered as positive change, in all areas of society (economic, cultural, political, agricultural, climatologic et cetera).

powerless. Also for this reason, migrants' agency will be given considerate attention in the following chapters.

A distinction can be made between relative and absolute development. Relative development can be conceptualized in development tiers. Absolute development can be considered as a combination of the broad range of societal changes all working together to facilitate safer and more agreeable lives (healthcare, food production, education, technology, legal systems, politics, governance, culture, arts et cetera).

Roughly two ways of looking at development have been emerging from literature. One starts from dealing with threats people face, the other from chances and possibilities. The first approach has historical roots in missionary and colonial times, when poor and remote living people seem to be considered as different and backward in general. Its storyline is that underdeveloped people face dangers like starvation, illness and (tribal) violence, so the 'developed world' should help them by alleviating their misery and bringing food and modern knowledge and technology. The second approach departs from the differences in possibilities that fundamentally equal people have and how limitations reduce their choices in life. It is within this second way of looking at development that roughly six approaches can be distinguished⁷⁹ (Table 2). Poverty alleviation is the historical goal of most approaches. As poverty is differently conceived of, the idea of development differs accordingly.

Table 2 – Approaches to poverty and development

Monetary	Poverty is economic: lack of income or consumption. Good cross-country comparison, but well-being not considered.
Capabilities/Freedom	Poverty is failure to achieve basic capabilities (food production, healthcare, education). Public goods are valued as well, but quantification difficult. Sen (1999), Nussbaum.
Social exclusion	Poverty result of social phenomena. Societal context considered. Comparative research difficult.
Participatory	Poverty is as experienced by local people. Developed by World Bank. Difficulty: general conclusions from many voices.
Human Security	Security of food and basic provisions for life, and security from violence are basic human rights and should be considered first priority for all people.
New Poverty Agenda	UN, Millennium Development Goals, Sachs (2005). Clear analysis, targets and objectives. In a way supporting basic capabilities in poor countries: food, health, education, gender equality, environment. Call for global partnership.

Source: Laderchi, Saith and Stewart (2003) and this author

⁷⁹ Laderchi, Saith and Stewart (2003) coined the first four, while the author added the last two.

The monetary, economic approach is almost omnipresent. Poverty is often depicted in the number of people living under a certain poverty line, often \$1.00 per person per day. The capability approach is developed by most notably Amartya Sen (1999). Instead of monetary wealth, with Sen freedom of choice is the leading direction for development out of poverty. The choices to lead the life one desires include availability of nutrition, healthcare, education, housing et cetera, but could as well encompass choices to live where one would desire. In this light, migration restrictions can contribute to poor living conditions.

Social exclusion considers poverty as a result of social process, while the participatory approach stresses the importance of poor people's agency by relating poverty to the way that it is experienced. This last approach takes into account that poverty is relative but can be experienced as absolute as well. The Human Security approach draws violence and environmental threats into the poverty-development discourse. Human security discourse in relation to development is characterized by Wilhelm von Humboldt's statement: "No freedom without security."⁸⁰ Security encompasses much more than freedom from violence here; it includes political, social, economic and ecological security. These dimensions of security can be recognized as reasons for people to move: poverty, war and environmental degradation.⁸¹

The New Poverty Agenda is omnipresent in recent development discourse as it is associated with the UN Millennium Development Goals. Its probably most well known scientific proponent is economist Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs (2005) has written a widely read road map of development, with pragmatic optimism. Sachs played a role in leading the Millennium Development Goals through the United Nations political arena, and is now charged with realizing practical development programmes through the African 'Millennium Villages' project.⁸² The roadmap set out by Sachs for the UN is broad-based, targeting locally specific issues like agriculture, healthcare, education and infrastructure at the same time and for a limited period, of several years.⁸³ Examples are malaria nets, roads, artificial manure, but all tailored to specific local needs. Sachs' pragmatic approach seems to coincide with a general doubt to the effect of development aid, voiced by William Easterly (2006), Dambisa Moyo (2009) and others. In this place this debate will not be specifically analysed, but a short summary would be: aid does not work because forty years of Official Development Aid (ODA) has not put an end to poverty and had a lot of negative side effects. As a result, the public trust in ODA seems to have been falling.

The recent great attention for the role of remittances could be explained from this paralysis. Remittances are believed to have generous positive development impact for receiving countries – this reasoning clearly in line with the monetary

⁸⁰ Stather in BICC 2008: 7

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² www.millenniumvillages.org

⁸³ Sachs (2005)

approach to poverty. Driven by World Bank economists⁸⁴ The increased attention for remittances forms the basis of the topic that at the point of writing has captured the international development debate to a large extent: the link between migration and development. But before elaborating on this alleged link, a position will be taken on how poverty and development will be conceived of in this paper.

Development and poverty-eradication in practice are also political projects. As Diamond (1997) has convincingly shown, historical domination of Western Europe and the US ('The North') over other areas ('The South') has grown out of sheer coincidence; people who developed their knowledge, technology and resistance to diseases sooner than others just lived in the right places. Until recently, only about 50 years ago, it was considered perfectly just to impose Western colonial rule, culture and technology onto 'other' societies. Interestingly the concepts of 'poverty' and 'development' highlight the poor, but not the rich, and as a result invoke a blind eye to inequality. The shift towards an inclusive humanity that is indicated by notions as the universality of human rights and 'development as freedom' is profound and in progress.⁸⁵ As politicians negotiate 'development' policies with an eye on their electorates, this shift takes whole societies to move with it. Social scientists, recognizing social constructivist positions,⁸⁶ seem to be increasingly aware of the fact that the concept of development *has* to be politicized, and will *always* reflect power relations. For this reason, in discussing policy positions in chapter 5 a distinction will be made between the ethically desired idea of development and the politically viable – often implicit – meaning. For now, the politically viable idea of development is considered to be the monetary, economic approach with, as became clear from Bakewell's (2008) argument, neo-colonial qualities. In this thesis the ethically desired idea of development will be a synthesis of the capabilities approach and the idea of human security. Development as it *should* be will from here on be considered to be *the social and political economic process of societal change⁸⁷ in which people's capabilities grow as they desire, with – if actively pursued in policy making – the goal to provide a fair minimum level of human security.*

Before moving towards migration and development theory, a useful distinction put forward by Hans Rosling (2007) in a public lecture might prove valuable for the translation from development theory to policy. Rosling argues simply that the *goals* and the *means* to development are often mixed up. Means to development, like economic growth, should be considered as facilitating that what makes life worthwhile: cultural experience. From this perspective, economic growth can be an important means in working towards more human security and freedom, so every person may perhaps eventually lead the life he or she desires.


⁸⁴ One of the first was Dilip Ratha, publishing the article 'Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance' in 2003.

⁸⁵ Just as, at the same time, health and economic situations are improving.

⁸⁶ See 3.1.1

⁸⁷ economic, cultural, political, agricultural, climatologic changes, more specifically changes in healthcare, food production, education, technology, legal systems, politics, governance, culture, arts et cetera

Table 3 – Means versus Goals for development



Korotou Diallo

Korotou Diallo lives in a Parisian suburb, since 1980 now. Korotou's story illustrates how social structures can suffer from labour migration. She married in Mali at the age of 15 before moving to Paris with her husband. Korotou lives with her daughter and works as a cleaner. Her impression is that if you earn money in Africa you have money, but here in Europe you have to pay too much taxes to be able to retain anything.

Life is hard for her. In Mali she says, you do not have much but friends and family will always support you. Her opinion is that all Africans need the family. She misses the family life a lot. Korotou looks quite lonely in her suburban grey concrete flat. The question what future she desires for her daughter is answered by the girl herself: she goes to school. This seems to hold the greatest promise for her; her daughter is receiving education.



But her husband has now abandoned her. And her heart still lies in Bamako. When asked she is very clear about this: she wants to live in Mali, because she loves her country and misses the family. At the time she left she hoped to be able to work and send money home, as well as buy a house in Mali.

3 Perceived Transitional Mobility Systems – theoretically including migrant’s agency

How to study, describe, explain or even understand something as complex as international migration? What influences the choices people make for leaving, settling, returning, or to leave again and again? Is it poverty in the sense of the need to feed children? Violence? The existence of human traffickers? What explains their exact behaviour? The weather? Governments by way of migration policies? Geography? A utopian image of 'the west', or television, or technology for that matter? Or is it the extended family structure? Or world economy and its disparities? And what about xenophobia, the influence of the mere idea of 'invasion', or the idea that Islam and Christianity can never be united? Many kinds of economic, social and political factors, *and* linkages between them, *and* feedback processes, probably all influence migration.⁸⁸ The crucial question emphasizing the need for theoretical tools is, how to proceed from this complexity if linkages over space and time are sought between migration and something as complex as development? As will be shown, systems theory helps with structuring spatial relations. Complexity theory will help finding patterns in temporal change. The concept of transitions provides a link between spatial and temporal dimensions. A focus on perceptions has a threefold advantage; it serves as a tool to select relevant issues in a complex field, helps bridging levels of aggregation and in doing so presses to involve migrants’ agency (see Table 4).

Table 4 – Approaches to theory with corresponding dimensions

Systems	spatial relations
Complexity	patterns in change over time
Transitions	linking spatial and temporal change
Perceptions	select relevant issues in complex field, bridge levels of aggregation, involve migrants’ agency

To distinguish between migration *theory* from the still fast growing body of literature⁸⁹ and the use of more meta-analytical tools from systems and complexity theory, the latter will be addressed as *approach*. This approach may help introducing dynamics into the various often-static mainstream theories explaining migration. In this chapter the main features and benefits of systems and complexity theory are discussed as the combined idea of complex systems approach. Then a selection of current migration theory is presented and discussed as complex systems. After introducing transitions as a tool to explain systemic change, finally a framework for circular migration theory will be proposed based on the interactions between migration and development.

⁸⁸ See Skeldon 1997: 9 and also Jennissen 2007.

⁸⁹ See on particularly migration and development the useful oversight in Skeldon 1997: 17.

3.1 Complex systems approach

An approach to complex systems is to a large extent dependent on the ontological position taken. Complex systems and transition approaches shed different light on what can be known. For this reason, an ontological starting point is now laid out.

3.1.1 Approaching knowledge and the value of subjective truth

What can social scientists know? The epistemological position in social research in the recent past undoubtedly has moved with the postmodern tide, coining social constructivism to deal with the notion that what we know is *often if not always* an *observation* of social facts. Whether social facts do exist even has become questionable. This author sticks to the position that if social research is conducted for some purpose (like informing policy making), eventually it has to be the experience and interpretation of the people affected that makes up what counts as the relevant concept of reality.⁹⁰ A lifebuoy concept safeguarding the social scientist from nihilist reductionism could be *tautology*: “[a]n aggregate of linked propositions in which the validity of the *links* between them cannot be doubted.”⁹¹ In the case of this research, this means that while the meaning of the concept development may be questioned and open to varying definitions, a proven relationship between people sending money to a country and a growing gross domestic product in that country will still hold as a scientific fact.

As this paper aims to deliver some policy recommendations, the experience of the people affected forms reality, leading us towards a post-positivist ontological position. However, while examining this position in the International Relations (IR) theoretical debate a sense of dissatisfaction surfaces. As Alexander Wendt, one of the founders of social constructivism for the discipline has put it, “Neither positivism, nor scientific realism, nor poststructuralism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. Philosophies of science are not theories of international relations”.⁹² Wendt describes theorizing in IR as based on the “*relationship* between agency, process, and social structure”.⁹³ This relationship is constantly defined in terms of trade-offs; is structure the defining variable *or* are identities and interests? Which are more defining, domestic factors *or* systemic factors? According to Wendt, we cannot answer these questions unless we have a “framework for doing systemic research”. Such a framework has been difficult to find.

⁹⁰ Taken further, this argument could easily be taken to be applicable to all social research; when published, all research runs the risk of being used for one purpose or the other. Steve Smith (2004) demonstrates how this can happen.

⁹¹ Bateson and Bateson 1987: 212. While links are considered to be true, the truth of the propositions that are linked in tautology is not claimed. Conclusions thus reached from tautology can always in some way be doubted. Truth is always dependent on the propositions of tautology, bound together in what Thomas Kuhn (1962) would call a paradigm.

⁹² Wendt 1992: 423

⁹³ *ibid.*:422, emphasis added.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to give an account of the scientific–philosophical debate around what can be known, it starts from the position that a systems–approach can serve as a clarifying conceptual frame, that is conceptually located somewhere between issues of ontology and more 'applied', empirically based theorizing. In general, it seems that since post–modernism has entered the debate, IR scholars are in limbo concerning the ontology and epistemology of their discipline. Jackson and Sørensen, discussing the methodological debate in IR, define ontological positions between objectivism and subjectivism, and epistemological positions between explaining and understanding. They argue how some IR scholars try to "seek out a middle ground which avoids the stark choice between either objectivism or subjectivism, either pure explaining or pure understanding."⁹⁴

This position can be taken one step further from the perspective of systems theory. As will be argued, systems theory offers conceptual space where existing, more empirically rooted IR theory often fits in. Therefore, as has been mentioned, it will be considered an *approach* here, to indicate that it is not a theory in the sense of realism or liberalism, relative deprivation or world systems theory.⁹⁵ Neither is it a *kind of theory*, like normative theory.⁹⁶ Since existing theoretical concepts can still be generally applied, it does not come down to a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense.⁹⁷ Systems theory in this paper will be applied and perhaps developed as a meta–theoretical approach.

3.1.2 Agency, feedback and impossible causality

Complex systems⁹⁸ are conceptual fields that can be mapped, described, in terms of flows of matter and/or information. When matter moves it leaves one place and enters another; when information flows it can also stay where it came from. When information flows loop back and inform the previous process as feedback, systems can govern themselves.⁹⁹

Why is this relevant for governing migration? There are two main reasons. First, if complex processes are to be regulated, they have to be designed to partially govern themselves, as it would be impossible to obtain and process all information centrally. Second, reasoning from complex systems theory shows the importance of migrants' agency. The concept of levels of aggregation delivers theoretical space to deal with the analytical differences between the individual notion of agency and the aggregate notion of migration flows. This is why complex systems theory is useful for analysing migration patterns and policy. Complex systems thinking brings a focus on

⁹⁴ Jackson and Sørensen 2003: 263

⁹⁵ World systems theory, developed by Wallerstein on Marxist ideas, is not a systems approach in the sense it will be developed here. It will be further explored as part of the theoretical framework laid down in the next chapter.

⁹⁶ Normative theory as developed by for example Chris Brown (1992).

⁹⁷ Kuhn (1962)

⁹⁸ It is beyond the scope of this paper to specify the roots of complexity and systems theory or go into the validity of their combination. An overview can be found at <http://www.irit.fr/COSI/project/results/wt1/index.php>.

⁹⁹ This field of research within systems theory is referred to as cybernetics.

information loops, bringing in building blocks for a time dimension that often is lacking in existing migration theory and that will be further developed when discussing systemic transitions in 3.3. To provide a quick overview of the main concepts underlying and forming complex systems, a summary is provided in Table 5.

Table 5 – Main concepts of complex systems theory

information	A 'difference that makes a difference'; a change (for example in knowledge about border patrols) that induces something else to change (for example migration routes). Information is decentrally distributed in the system
Elements	Parts making up a system
Flows	Internal system dynamics; either physical or information. Flows do not change the system itself if they stay within certain limits; the bias.
Bias	Outer limits within which flows can increase or decrease <i>without changing the system</i> . ¹⁰⁰
non-deterministic	Systems have a <i>function</i> but not a <i>purpose</i>
system dynamics	In most systems, variables tend to interact so a change in one results in a change of the bias of others. In increasingly complex systems these effects of cross-influencing are likely to increase as well (existential dynamics are learning, evolution, emergence and collapse).
systemic change	External system dynamics; the system <i>itself</i> changes
system transition ¹⁰¹	The system changes to such extent that its <i>function</i> (not in teleological sense per se) changes, or it collapses
Feedback	Information following from a flow that influences the flow itself at another point in the system. ¹⁰²
self government	Regulation of a system without interference from outside, as feedback informs flows to stay within certain limits.
oscillation	Example of unwanted side-effect from feedback
iterations	Subsequent periods of system transition, in which a system typically is slightly transformed to try different options. Necessary structure of model mapping of a system. ¹⁰³
classes	Ordering of information based on differing logical types
levels of aggregation	Logical layers in which elements of a system behave ¹⁰⁴ (the individual level

¹⁰⁰ A famous example is the household temperature switch; temperature can rise or drop between limits set on a dial on the wall. The system only changes

¹⁰¹ This term is introduced here by the author.

¹⁰² A very clear and early example takes the steam engine as an example: how to control the speed or power it delivers, beyond just increasing or decreasing the fuel for the fire heating the kettle? The reaction of the engine to this was often too slow. The governor was invented: a feedback device that regulated the amount of steam flowing into the cylinders. This device became part of the engine, so the engine became self-regulatory. It seemed simple: when speed increases, the amount of steam decreases, and vice versa. But it wasn't always like that. The factor time gave birth to unpredicted effects. Sometimes oscillation ruined the system, as increasing and decreasing speeds formed a pattern that was reinforced at comparable frequency by the reaction of the governor. Processes like this kind of oscillation seemed to be comparable through different kinds of systems. More important, as complexity rises, these processes still followed comparable predictable rules. Systems theory thus provides tools to find regularities that help in dealing with increasingly complex processes.

¹⁰³ "Necessarily, because of the problem of logic in describing circular cause and effect relations, models should be able to conceptualize different subsequent states of the structure in a system over time." (Bateson 1987: 43-44)

	and several group levels in social systems).
logical types	Differing properties of classes of elements, flows or information; elements from classes of different logical types are impossible to use in logical reasoning, because logical dissonance occurs.
causal logic	Explaining structures of cause and effect, that often fail to explain phenomena occurring in complex systems
correlation	Explaining structures of seemingly connected events in which direction and nature of causation remains unspecified
emergence	The process of deriving new and coherent structures, patterns and properties due to patterns of interaction between elements of a system. Due to distribution of actors over differing levels of aggregation, these new patterns and properties can not be predicted
self-organization and learning	Structures emerging in a system become stable and cause the system to behave in previously unseen ways
evolution	The way a system develops through emergence and learning over different iterations, leading to change in a certain direction

Sources: Bateson (1979), Bateson and Bateson (1987), COSI Project (website).

One clear example of a complex system is a social group, consisting of elements that in themselves are complex systems: subgroups like a household, and in the end individuals. Problems of logical types occur when causes and effects on the level of a member are combined with logical reasoning with higher classes like a city; an individual can 'do' something for some reason, but the city 'acts' and responds in fundamentally different ways. Because of these problems, causal models as predominantly used in social sciences including International Relations are often incapable in explaining social phenomena. Complex systems theory relies more on correlation and patterns emerging from systems that to some extent can govern themselves and develop through evolution. Migration systems seem to be a clear-cut example of such a social system. Migrant networks form subsystems and communication channels through which information flows and feedback can occur, they can display self-organization and learning patterns, in sum those networks acquire behaviour and properties of their own. A complex systems approach makes it easier to focus on both patterns of change and defining the system.

The relevance for this thesis lies in particular with the difference between causality and correlation, and the emphasis on the difference in logical types over levels of aggregation. Regarding the latter argument, as this research focuses on inter-continent migration between Africa and Europe, the levels of aggregation between the individual decisions and inter-continental flows differ enormously. Therefore it is crucial to avoid errors of logical types by assuring that theory focuses

¹⁰⁴ You open one eye. One eye sees one dimension of the world. The mind forms a static picture. The picture carries information that shares a logical dimension; color, form and texture can be combined into meaningful observations. Now the second eye comes in. An almost-similar-picture enters the mind, with information on the same logical level. Now it happens. From the combination of the two pictures, depth emerges. This information is on a logical level independent of either one of the two pictures. It is only the specific combination that gives rise to a new order of information (Bateson 1976: 133).

on both the individual/extended family levels and the intercontinental level, and relevant levels in between, while retaining and acknowledging the differences between the levels in causal analysis. And while causal logic becomes harder to use, causal explanations lose their relevance. Correlations can be found but these have less predicting power than causal links. As a result, when governing migration systems this should always be done using evaluation and feedback mechanisms built into the policy structures. In other words, a governed migration system can never be designed and implemented in one step (iteration). Causality in such complex systems can only be proven retrospectively and for one moment in time. Predictability decreases with rising complexity, and policy making becomes increasingly a process of trial and error. This must be incorporated in programme design. To avoid false assumptions of causal links, correlations are preferred in describing the (suspected) relationships between variables of a system that is to be influenced through policies.

The system can be most accurately described starting from its members' perceptions. System boundaries are often ambiguous; a would be migrant would sure include illegal options while European policy proposals generally exclude those. To solve this problem of system description, to make sense out of amazing complexity, the system is what the actors *perceive* it to be. For policymaking this means that especially the perception of the migrants should be incorporated, as they ultimately make the decision to move in the way they think is most appropriate. If the system is to be influenced, it must go through influencing individual decisions.

3.2 A selection of migration theory

3.2.1 A review of mainstream theories

Massey *et al.* (1998) have written what seems to be the first comprehensive review of migration theory that in the same volume is tested against a number of cases. In their analysis they apply and specify a systems approach, but do not draw on complexity theory as has been done earlier in this chapter. They argue that explanations of international migration can be split in two types;¹⁰⁵ Initiation and perpetuation. The main theories are listed in Table 6. They will be briefly summarized before they are reviewed in the context of a perceived complex mobility systems approach.

¹⁰⁵ This section draws mainly on Massey *et al.* 1998: 17–59

Table 6 – Mainstream migration theory

Initiation	Perpetuation
Neoclassical economics	Social Capital Theory
New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM)	Cumulative Causation
Segmented Labour Market Theory	
World Systems Theory (WST)	

Neoclassical theory describes international labour migration as income maximalization. Migration thus is a function of “geographic differences in the supply of and demand for labour”¹⁰⁶ and subsequent wage differentials. Migration shall develop towards an equilibrium with a wage differential that would only reflect the costs of movement.

The *New Economics of Labour Migration* (NELM) challenges neoclassical assumptions: it is argued that migration decisions are often not made only by individual actors but by families, households and the larger social environment. Not only income maximalization but also risk management is a driving force. Households in this school diversify income risks by putting members at work in other geographical regions. Remittances thus play a large role in NELM theory. The idea of relative deprivation holds that households will not only try to improve their own income in absolute terms, but also will try to raise their income relative to other households.

Segmented Labour Market Theory is essentially a macro-level theory; it argues that international migration stems not from push-factors in sending countries but from pull-factors in receiving countries. It departs from a structural component of developed nations: wages reflect social status, and thus the lowest jobs are not popular by native workers, but still wages in this segment can not be easily raised as this would put pressure on higher paid jobs. This results in segmentation at the bottom, where a demand for immigrant labour persists.

World Systems Theory (WST), originating from historical-structural theory, “argues that the penetration of capitalist economic relations into non-capitalist [...] societies creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate.”¹⁰⁷ Global capitalism creates economic development and underdevelopment as regional phenomena that came to be known as core and periphery. The dependency thesis classifies developing countries according to their being dependent on dominant capitalist powers. WST too is a macro-level theory, looking at international migration in relation to the “macro-organization of socio-economic relations, the geographic division of labour, and the political mechanisms of power and domination.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Massey et al. 1998: 18

¹⁰⁷ *ibid*: 36

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*: 35

Perpetuation of international migration drives on the theory of *social* or *migration specific capital*: the idea that personal “ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin”¹⁰⁹ can be convertible into financial and other kinds of capital. A network of relationships can reduce costs of migration by providing information and access to jobs. It holds that migration perpetuates and accelerates because of *cumulative causation*. Each act of migration makes the next move easier in eight ways: network expansion, income and land distribution, agricultural organization, culture, regional human capital distribution, through social meaning of work (‘immigrant jobs’), and production structure.¹¹⁰ These will partly be recognized as feedback mechanisms from a systemic point of view.

Finding jobs comes out as an omnipresent explaining factor. This is the sole level of the system where the unit of analysis, men and women, *want*. On every higher level of aggregation, the system merely *does*.¹¹¹ As a result, from a policy makers’ point of view it may never be expected that a migration system will behave in certain desired ways, and – politically important – this undesired behaviour cannot be directly attributed to the elements at the lowest level of aggregation, in this case the migrants. It has been argued that perception of the system by all actors is crucial in defining the (limits of the) system.¹¹² Most theories lack a notion of perception¹¹³, and all theories except social capital theory lack an eye for the whole of interactions between (networks of) actors.

The ‘perpetuation–theories’, social capital and cumulative causation, have a wider eye for migrants’ agency as they draw human relations and cultural factors into the migration decision–making process. WST and social capital theory offer most conceptual space for illegal migration opportunities. Generally missing still is a framework for the assessment of the (individual) actors’ perceptions and interaction between them. To have a more complete explaining theory that would fit the perceived migration systems approach, common sense and intuition suggest expanding social capital theory. This could perhaps be done through an assessment of the migration decision of a substantial number of migrants. This possibly would result in a wide range of factors that will influence or have influenced the decisions. This kind of research would rely on abduction of correlations, finding patterns in the systems, rather than on induction and deduction of causal factors in the tradition of the natural sciences and most social scientific theory.

When considering wide ranges of factors, it becomes obvious that all six main theoretical schools (see Table 6) might be relevant *at the same time*. The social capital theory of perpetuation can be of use together with neoclassical theory for instance when a migrant is informed about the wages at place of destination by a

¹⁰⁹ Ibid: 42

¹¹⁰ Ibid: 46

¹¹¹ This follows from the non–deterministic nature of complex systems.


¹¹² See 3.1.2

¹¹³ Although later refinements of the neoclassical model do include the idea that the decision to migrate is mainly dependent on the *expected* earnings gap (Massey et al. 1998: 51).

friend who has moved earlier, so the wage differential shows more clearly. When it is a job at the bottom of the social hierarchy in the receiving country, dual labour market theory can be applicable. If the potential migrant has a family that plays a role in the decision NELM helps making sense, while the move from a developing country into a developed invokes WST as explaining theory. Theories overlap just as they compete, which invokes a problem for the ultimate endeavour of making sense of it. An explanation is perhaps just as much given by the *choice of* theory as it is explained by this theory. The choice of theory can easily be politicized, as purely economic theory leads to completely different explanations than world systems theory does, and still they can apply to one and the same migrant.

An attempt at uniting the diverse theories as put forward by Massey et al. is made by Roel Jennissen. He draws on the theories to depict chains of causality in an international migration system influenced by four groups of determinants (political, social, economic and ‘linkages’); see Figure 8.

Figure 8 – Integrated theoretical framework




Source: Jennissen (2007)

Jennissen’s approach is interesting because it offers a tool for making an inventory of factors with the potential to influence international migration, on a descriptive level. On a predictive level though, the model is likely to fail because the broad view is reached at the expense of explanation. It fails to offer explanation for two reasons. First, the categories of ‘society’ and ‘economy’ are such large classes of factors that the ‘true’ effect of one factor will be very hard to assess in analyses; controlling for other factors will become too difficult. Complexity soars, as is illustrated when all potential casual relations Jennissen induces from the six theories are put together in one diagram (Figure 8).

Where is the migrant? Where are other actors? From this perspective, the model does not much more than placing migrants (and thus migration) within a cobweb of influences from societies, economies, policies, and linkages between them. Which comes down to the truism that migration is influenced by a broad range of factors; indeed ‘the context’. As causality is brought in to “in a way” introduce “a time dimension”¹¹⁴, the fabric of the system is sacrificed; it can no longer be deduced from the model how a migration system behaves or changes through flows of people, information, legislation et cetera. In terms of system dynamics, the time dimension is not introduced. Instead, circular chains of causation appear to evolve.

Following systems theory in the tradition of Bateson, this approach is flawed. Causal logic is hampered in two respects. Spanning different levels of aggregation (mixing up flows and individual decisions), problems of different logical typing occur. Second, as seen in chapter two, logic is hampered as a model for cause and effect in circular systems. Therefore it is *necessary* to deploy a model with different iterations,

Figure 8 – Causality chains combined



showing the changes of the structure of the system at different times. Jennissen does not conceptualize iterations, sequences of structural change.

Jennissen’s approach does show the complexity involved in describing and explaining international migration. The conclusion that “a detailed analysis of the causality chains that are applicable to a particular migration flow may be used to forecast the course of this migration flow over time”, seems to display reductionism, and is not very much beyond conclusions by Massey et al. (1998). Due to increasing complexity, a way of reasoning that is completely the other way around seems more promising. The causal way of reasoning starts from contextual factors (which to

¹¹⁴ Jennissen 2007: 422

choose?) influencing migration (flows?). It is asked, which *factors* do influence migration. It might be more fruitful to ask, what migration *decisions* are and will be done by whom, and why? One would have to ask migrants to start with. Relevant factors from the complexity of the worldwide context might pop up accordingly. Examining these, unexpected regularities might emerge that can very well be comprised of combinations between perceived economic chances, the weather, and even feelings of love, desire, loneliness and hope.

The systems approach is not about integrating key aspects of different theories. Starting from all actors, it implies measuring flows, looking for feedback and self-regulation mechanisms, estimating how they can be influenced or created, and an evolutionary, iterative approach when systemic changes are desired.

3.2.2 Defining international migration systems

A definition of international migration systems could be *the whole of actions by and interactions between (networks of) actors perceiving sets of opportunity structures and constraints related to crossing borders between countries for reasons other than short-term visit*. This definition starts from the perceptions of the people involved. Places are deliberately not a strong defining feature. Migration systems have generally been defined in geographical terms: Massey *et al.* build on Mabohunje who recognized migration as a “spatial process with a clear geographic form and structure”,¹¹⁵ to finally adopt an approach by Kritz *et al.* that defines migration systems as “networks of countries linked by migration interactions whose dynamics are largely shaped by the functioning of a variety of networks linking actors at different levels of aggregation”.¹¹⁶ It is argued here that human decisions should be the defining quality of a migration system. Following Bateson’s aphorism that “the map is not the territory”¹¹⁷; the decision to migrate is probably based on a mental map of the destination that comprises much more than just the geography. It is tempting to use a country as a defining feature of the system, but it are sets of opportunities and threats in social and economic terms that really matter.

Focusing on countries or regions in defining a migration system introduces several (potential) errors from the start. First, people become entities ready for abstraction, moving within a representation of places on earth based on tremendous simplifications: the geographical map. Easily individuals become aggregate numbers, only defined by their country of birth and destination. Second, geographical borders appear to be very static. The tremendous dynamics of perceived and effective borders are not represented. Even a seemingly inherently static barrier like the Mediterranean Sea is from the human viewpoint constantly changing as traffickers come, go and change their routes, airlines change tariffs, political situations change and make border territories more or less easy to penetrate, and even weather

¹¹⁵ Maboguneje (1970) in Massey *et al.* 1998: 60

¹¹⁶ Kritz *et al.* (1992) in Massey *et al.* 1998: 61

¹¹⁷ Bateson (1979: 30)

changes can be decisive. Third, what matters for the system as a whole is not the different areas where people come, go and travel, but the connections between them. Border restrictions stemming from immigration policy only effectively exist in relation to other countries and the people for whom the laws apply. The countries do matter, but mainly when referred to by connecting concepts like laws and travel routes, networks of social ties, flows of money, goods, ideas, and of course flows of people. This leads to a forth potential error: overlooking essential explaining factors. Irregular migration might be related to legal migration, but explaining how both modes are related is difficult. Starting from human perception of opportunity structures, it can easily become clear that both legal and irregular migration can be regarded as two options for one and the same decision stemming from the urge to work and live abroad. Looking at official numbers, the influence of traffickers can easily be overlooked. Exploring migration experiences from the perspective of an African would-be migrant, this seems an anomaly.

Continuing the description of a migration system, short-term visiting of family and relatives can be left out. Also tourists are expected to have not enough influence on the general migration system to be included in the definition. All other reasons to visit another country for a longer or shorter period, like work or family formation, are considered to have defining quality for the system; since duration of stay often is an arbitrary argument this is not further specified in the definition of a perceived migration system.

The definition of migration systems has consequences for very general concepts within common migration discourse. For example, emigration is leaving a country of residence. Immigration is the act of entering a country for purposes other than tourism or temporary visit. Starting from migration systems theory, these definitions would come out quite different. Emigration would become changing one's society of birth for another economic, social and geographical environment. Immigration would become a name for the change of a social and economic environment prevalent in a particular place, by offering hospitality to people from a different society.

3.3 Humps and Transitions – concepts for describing systemic change

The concept of migration transitions is a way of theoretically linking development with mobility patterns, specifically for areas as they transform from subsistence levels to more vital societies with lower mortality and fertility ('vitality').¹¹⁸ Phases in

¹¹⁸ The original theory as developed by Skeldon (1997: 31–37) who built upon Zelinsky (1971) has been criticised for its roots in modernization theory (De Haas 2007a: 42); a single linear path to development is a-historical. Although local differences are profound, the transition of 'vitality' (mortality, fertility, population growth) is regularly observed in many developing areas (see 2.2.1, Development as health and economic growth – basic facts).

demographic development (over time) are linked to mobility patterns that have been observed to happen more regularly during those phases. From a complex systems point of view, this is an example of observed patterns of correlation, and much of the critique on migration transition theory¹¹⁹ is based on the absence of causal logic. As De Haas (2006a, 67) argues, while migration systems generally are described in *spatial* dimensions (with some feedback loops), migration transitions offer a more versatile frame for *temporal* dimensions: change.

Developing societies tend to move through phases with first high mortality and fertility rates, second with declining mortality and rising population, third also declining fertility and hence a stabilizing population, and fourth a general stabilization. From the first to the second phase all migration increases, including international circular and permanent migration (which at that time are largely impossible to distinguish). From the second to the third net out-migration often changes to net immigration. During the fourth, 'advanced' phase areas are dependent on immigration and demography stabilizes.

If not the developing society is taken as point of departure, but the geographical map, the phases of development can be seen moving on the map over time. So now the system changes in three dimensions: development in a place, people leaving and returning, and the development phase ('labour frontier') slowly shifting in geographical position. Since development tends to happen in very fragmented ways both over space and time, drawing maps with labour frontiers involves large generalizations. Furthermore, global data on emigration over time is very fragmented still. With this information it would perhaps be possible to produce geographical maps that could be used in defining place and *change of location* of labour frontiers, which would be helpful in policymaking.

A major shortcoming of this model is that it does not cope with changing age balances, in Skeldon's (1997: 34) word *cohort effects*, while these changes are obviously related to changes in fertility and mortality underlying the model. Furthermore, the transitions theory resembles the theory of the 'migration hump'.¹²⁰ Major differences between the theories are that the migration hump is explained in terms of economic development. It holds that in less developed societies migration is low because people do not have the means to travel. As societies develop migration grows rapidly (the 'hump') because living in richer parts of the world offers large advantages. As the economy grows even further, eventually migration will slow down as opportunities in the home region have grown to a level that makes leaving less attractive.

When models are further developed, there seems to be little reason not to combine economic variables with the demographics. The general conclusion from the model is that "[o]nly at later stages of development do regions and countries tend to transform from net labour exporters to net labour importers. Empirical evidence has

¹¹⁹ Critique as also stated by Skeldon himself (Skeldon 1997: 34)

¹²⁰ (Martin and Taylor 1996 in De Haas 2006a: 68)

been found for “recent decades with countries as diverse as Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea.”¹²¹

De Haas (2007a) recognizes that transitional migration–development models should be built on broader conceptions of development, and that the relations should be considered more “probabilistic” than “direct and deterministic”. This converges with imperatives from complex systems theory. It will be argued in chapter 5 that this kind of models might best be further developed during and *as integral part of* iterative policy development processes.

3.4 Migration and Development – Towards a circular migration theory

Which theory could both explain migration and development, and predict to some extent the direction into which a migration–development system will change? What would a complex systems–approach of migration and development theory look like? The migration and development theory that will –mostly implicitly– be used in the analysis to come will be described using a list of dimensions as well as some questions. Starting point is a theoretical blueprint worked out by Massey and his researchers.

Massey et al. (1998) work out four basic elements for “any satisfactory theoretical account of international migration”¹²². They are

“a treatment of the structural forces that promote emigration from developing countries; a characterization of the structural forces that attract immigrants into developed nations; a consideration of the motivations, goals, and aspirations of the people who response to these structural forces by becoming international migrants; and a treatment of the social and economic structures that arise to connect areas of out- and in-migration.”¹²³

An implication from systems theory is that the first and second elements (‘push and pull factors’) can only be defined starting from the third element: the motivations and goals of the migrants themselves. The forth element serves to ‘connect the dots’, prescribing that theory should also focus on links between home and host societies. A focus on connections between *people* in home and host societies will be added to Massey et al.’s treatment of links between *areas*.

Pulling together theory on migration and development, system dimensions that need to be reflected in theory can be pinned down following the following questions.

¹²¹ De Haas 2007a: 43

¹²² Massey et al. 1998: 281

¹²³ Ibid.

- is the system described starting from **perceptions** of the main actors? In other words, is agency recognised to find a way out of complexity?
- are **iterations** mapped and conceptualised?
- is **feedback** conceptualized?
- are **adjustments** to variables (within boundaries) after periodic evaluations built in?
- are differing **layers of aggregation** treated separately?

The Labour Frontier offers a useful concept for describing a system's main spatial and temporal dimensions. It is ultimately and constantly being defined by individual decisions by tens of thousands of people to go and work elsewhere. Other aspects of migration–development systems include for the home countries: remittances, migration–related inequality (De Haas in Vermaas 2007: 3), brain drain, gain and circulation, diasporas, dependency, social ‘side-effects’ (ie. family separation, tension between returnees and non-migrants). For host countries they include the filling of labour shortages, social unrest and the emergence of diasporas. All countries have to cope with widening global labour markets to *average* economic advantage. All these aspects can surface when the system is described from the position of all relevant actors.

Transitional system change offers theoretical space for linking migration and development. Building on this for a circular migration theory, changes of the entire system – sending and receiving countries, and migrants’ preferences – can be conceptualized in phases of transition. These phases would constitute *iterations* from complex systems theory. Iterations can be used to describe the temporal dimension of a migration–development system. Summing up conclusions from this chapter, a description of a migration–development system could be built along the dimensions listed in Table 7.

Making sure that a theoretical description of a migration–development system follows roughly these dimensions will help to make sure that the assumptions implicitly informing theory do not lead to a bias in the outcome of an analysis towards the overly powerful receiving countries (that mostly initiate policies) or towards overly simplistic static models of the social fabric and logically faulty chains of cause and effect.

Table 7 – Theoretical frame for Perceived Transitional Mobility Systems

Perceptions: Motivations, goals and aspirations of people who are or will be migrants
Motivations, goals and aspirations of other actors (families, host society actors, government representatives et cetera)
Structural forces promoting emigration
Structural forces attracting immigration
Social and economic structures arising between people and places in home and host societies
Economic dimensions including estimate of remittances
Spatial dimensions
Time dimensions, (expected) system dynamics
Labour frontier position and (expected) change direction and speed
Iterations, 'rounds' of systemic change
Feedback loops
Adjustment variables: economic and other (numerical) parameters
Expected variable boundaries
Layers of aggregation, that should be treated separately in theory and practice

Mr. Ba

Ba misses his five year old boy and seven year old daughter. Not having any diplomas he can't work in Mauritania and now tries his luck in Paris, France. Meeting him there in February 2009, he has just arrived. When he first came he was nervous, but now he has met a friend. A friend of his uncle, Sal. Sal has recently passed away and now Ba can rent his bed in the *foyer*, a communal housing project.

This strategy, finding housing and jobs using social networks, is prevalent here. It is the basis of the self-perpetuating nature of migration; once some people from some place have settled somewhere, they attract more people from their region. But this seems to be Ba's only strategy. He still has now idea of where to work or what he could do. He only feels the need to go, because his children ask him for food, pens, clothing, and he has nothing to give them and sees no way to earn money in Kaedi, Mauritania.



In his own words, "when you are with your family and can do nothing for them, that's worse than leaving. The family finds it difficult that I left but I have no alternative. You can not forget them for one second."

4 Circular Migration – *Gastarbeit* Repeated?

Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, es kamen Menschen.

–Max Frisch

‘Circular migration’ fully entered international migration discourse when Kofi Annan, then UN-Secretary-General, published his 2006 report on Migration and Development.¹²⁴ Three years earlier a ‘Global Commission’ on the subject had been established, and the global-level policy focus on migration and development has been given further momentum with the establishment of a Global Forum which meets yearly, first in Brussels in July 2007, and again in Manilla in October 2008 and in Athens in November 2009. But what is circular migration (CM) more than a temporary working scheme like the German *Gastarbeiter* programme? What *is* CM, as a discourse and as an empirical phenomenon?

This chapter will try to answer this question investigating CM as a discourse in UN and EU policy making, and as a – social scientifically investigated – practice around the world. To ‘select’ CM practice, a working definition is needed. Policymakers can hijack the subject to serve political goals. For this reason, a social scientist’s analysis¹²⁵ of CM in global policy is taken as a starting point. Vertovec takes six policy documents on the subject and analyses the meaning that is given to circular migration and the underlying assumptions. Starting from this analysis, a preliminary answer will be given to the question what is called circular migration. The resulting definition will then be used to select five cases of circular migration systems¹²⁶ that have been researched. After analysing these systems, the next chapter will be devoted to the question what CM can do as a policy instrument in relation to development.

As CM is considered to be a ‘triple win’ solution in the discourse, are downsides assessed as well? Differences can be expected between social scientific accounts of circular migration and policy proposals. How are policymakers dealing with the sensitive nature of migration in the political arena?

Leading question of this chapter is, what is “circular migration”? Is it a concept used for describing migration at a group level or can individual ‘circular migrants’ be singled out? Theory and practice seem to be quite far apart in many senses. To what extent are existing migration practices already circular in nature? Vertovec’s (2007) analysis of policy documents shows how many policymakers build on a quite small body of empirical research. This raises the question to what extent circular migration is viable. What is the basis for the shared enthusiasm, generally brought forward through the ‘triple win’ argument? Following, both existing empirical research and

¹²⁴ UN (2006).

¹²⁵ The account by Steven Vertovec (2007).

¹²⁶ Without the necessity for these systems to be labelled as circular at the time.

leading policy ideas will be reviewed with the help of transitional complex systems theory. Policy documents will be analysed using a simple discourse analysis, while cases as described by different researchers are scrutinized using a comparative approach.

4.1 Circular migration in policy documents

Circular Migration entered the international migration-and-development policy debate around 2005, when it was broadly realized that remittances –money migrants send ‘back home’– have become a substantial international economical factor. The United Nations describe how recorded remittances have doubled in the past fifteen years, to have reached a total of \$232 in 2006 which is over double the amount of official development aid (ODI). Unofficial flows are estimated much higher.¹²⁷ The viability of the idea was strengthened by a growing awareness of the role of transnational networks facilitated by foremost modern communication and cheaper airfares. Steven Vertovec at the International Migration Institute of the University of Oxford has compared six international policy documents in 2007. A summary of his findings can be found in Table 8.

Table 8 – Circular migration in policy documents

	Definition of Circular Migration	Arguments	Recommendations /conclusions
UN (2005): GCIM Report	Ongoing temporary migration	CM for development	Countries of destination can promote CM by providing mechanisms and channels of access
IOM (2005): World Migration	Repeat temporary labour migration	Return might help development; to ensure return good CM programmes will help	Open channels offer future return to the same job. Dual citizenship arrangements, more flexible visa
WB (2006): Labour Migration in Eastern Europe	Repeat temporary labour migration	CM as a more politically viable option when public opinion is opposing permanent settlement of unskilled	No specific economical benefits to be expected
EC (2005a): Communication on Migration and Development	Repeat temporary employment	CM for development; Transfer of skills to developing world.	Offer right to return to job after period abroad; appropriate rewards to return
EC (2005b): Policy Plan on Legal Migration	Repeat seasonal employment	EU labour needs can be addressed by encouraging circular migration	Long-term multiple-entry visas, easier entry for former participants, EU database of ‘successful’ returnees

¹²⁷ Vertovec (2007)

House of Commons(2004): Migration and Development	Return <i>home</i> temporarily	CM schemes as incentives for sending countries to counter illegal migration	Offer leave of absence to facilitate temporary return
EU (2007): Communication on CM and mobility partnerships	Return home temporarily <i>and</i> repeat temporary employment	CM is a credible alternative to illegal migration	Dialogue and cooperation with third countries necessary; legislative framework is needed; measures for return necessary
OECD (2007): Gaining from Migration	Repetitive seasonal or temporary labour migration	Enable labour migration without granting citizens rights to stimulate development	Adequate incentives for both employers and employees are necessary; multi-use work permits, flexible re-entry, transferable pensions and social security

Sources: Vertovec (2007) and this author

What stands out is that definitions are not generally given. To answer the question what exactly is meant with CM, it is necessary to induce the implicit definitions from the context. This has been done here with reference to (explicit definitions in) the original documents. All but one, the House of Commons report (2004), consider circular migration as *repeat temporary labour migration*. How long temporary will be is generally unspecified, except where CM is defined as repeated *seasonal* employment.¹²⁸ The House of Commons (2004) takes a radically different perspective, looking at migrants departing not from the home countries but from the host country. Instead of CM as temporary working abroad, the concept is about migrant workers from the UK *temporarily going home* in order to be able to share knowledge, while *return to the host country* is assured.

Return is the first issue to be addressed in most policy documents. Considering the perceived failure of previous ‘temporary’ programmes like the German *Gastarbeiter* or the US–Mexican *Bracero* programmes this is understandable. It also invokes the question to what extent CM is used as a pretext for implementing return programmes, a question that will be dealt with later.¹²⁹

A recent addition to Vertovec’s work might be the 2007 EU Communication “on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships”. Here the discrepancy between the House of Commons report and the other publications is bridged by acknowledging two “main forms” of CM; that of “third-country nationals settled in the EU” and that of “persons residing in a third country”. It seems that the two “forms” of CM are profoundly different. The idea of return has a completely different meaning for both forms. The necessity to define two different forms of circularity shows that in short term the circle always has starting and ending points. From this point of view, the notion of ‘repetitive route’ would be more appropriate than ‘circle’ and the legal and political realization of this ideal is not yet within reach. Second, the 2007

¹²⁸ Where seasonal is underspecified as well but will not exceed nine months per stay.

¹²⁹ The question will be covered in 4.4.2.

Communication gives a slightly specified answer to the question who the ‘circular migrant’ might be. Associated with the first “form”, that of settled migrants to their home countries, are “business persons,[...] doctors, professors and other professionals”.¹³⁰ The second category is associated with “the whole spectrum of migrants”, including temporary workers, students, trainees, researchers, general “people-to-people exchanges” and voluntary workers.¹³¹ A third addition to (circular) migration discourse is the concept of “Mobility Partnerships”. The core of this idea is that sound migration policy should be negotiated in close collaboration with home countries. Home countries are to actively combat illegal migration and stimulate return, whereas host countries are to offer legal ways for temporary migrants to (repeatedly) enter. As migrants take money and knowledge back home and host countries increase their labour force, both countries are to win from the partnership.

The idea of Mobility Partnerships is taken somewhat further by a second addition to Vertovec’s analysis: the 2007 OECD report “Gaining from Migration. Towards a new Mobility System”. First, it seems that a shift in discourse from ‘migration’ towards ‘mobility’ is taking place in OECD discourse just as in EU texts. This adds dynamics to the conceptual debate, mobility being more fluid than migration in the sense that migration has mostly been associated with single movements.¹³² Second, the report does define CM, as “repetitive migration, whether seasonal or temporary”, with the difference between seasonal and temporary being that up to one year’s stay is seasonal while longer stays are temporary.¹³³

4.2 Discussion of policy papers – omitted perspectives

What is CM according to these reports? First, they do not exactly agree on the meaning of the concept, but the general consensus is that it encompasses *repetitive temporary labour migration*. All policy makers seem implicitly to start from the conviction that CM can be *managed* to some degree. The papers do not reflect the observation in literature that repetitive migration has been the rule and not the exception throughout history.¹³⁴

The meaning of ‘circular’ is ambiguous in terms of where the circular movement starts. Following the last cited EU communication¹³⁵, it does make a huge difference in legal and practical terms whether the circle starts in a home or host country. Second, what stands out is that CM has first been identified from the perspective of the labour-importing host countries, and only recently with the introduction of ‘mobility partnerships’ from the home-countries’ perspective as well. The perspectives of the migrants themselves are generally omitted. It seems to be that

¹³⁰ EU 2007: 9

¹³¹ Ibid. This second category obviously is very general and as such obsolete.

¹³² As seen in 2.1

¹³³ OECD 2007: 37, 2nd note

¹³⁴ Especially in labour frontier countries: see 4.3.5

¹³⁵ EU (2007) Communication on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships

the preferences of (potential) migrants are considered as fixed, boiling down to the assumption that in developing countries people want to work in richer countries and once they are there it will take incentives and pressure, carrots and sticks, to have them return. The act of repetitive migration though is very scarcely in the cited policy documents described from the point of view of wants and needs of migrants; the third 'win' of the triple win mantra is generally undefined. Third, the strong emphasis on return sometimes makes it difficult to differentiate CM policy from return programmes, which could reduce the proposed policies to return policy in disguise. While incentives for return are given, they are in the cited policy papers not weighted against the obvious option migrants have from perspective of their agency: to 'default' the programmes and slip into irregular jobs.

The question whether CM can be a viable policy strategy will be answered after looking at practices in the following case comparison. The question whether these kinds of programmes are desirable for all parties is not asked in all cited documents. Discussions of workers' rights and human rights and social 'side-effects' like those from prolonged family separation are very rare. It could be induced from lines of reasoning that the other options, staying in home countries or illegal migration, are worse, so every 'opening' is an improvement. This is to some extent naive, as will be shown by highlighting unwanted side effects coming to light in the following case discussion.

4.3 Practice – cases and key lessons

Five documented cases of managed CM will be discussed and compared (Table 10 on page 67). Little specified research on circularity has been conducted in the African-European context. For this reason we have to draw on three programmes in other regions: the Canadian-Mexican agricultural guestworker programme as described by Tanya Basok (2003), the US-Mexican *Bracero* programme following Martin (2003) and the case of German *Gastarbeiter* as researched by Constant and Zimmerman (2007). This case is the only one discussing some unmanaged CM practices. Again, lacking research on circular migration between Africa and Europe, three regional studies form the root of a description of African practices: Elkan (1967) on the growth of towns in East Africa, a recent study by Hein de Haas, (2006a) on North African migration systems and a paper by Aderanti Adepoju (2007) on trends in international migration in and from Africa. So generally we will be looking at five profoundly different geographic systems: Mexico-Canada, Mexico-US, Germany, Spain and North-East Africa. In all cases, a definition as used by the researchers will be derived as well as key dimensions they use in describing the systems. The North-African cases are different in nature because they do not always involve international migration. Still research on this region is analysed because it possibly sheds light on cultural and economic aspects that might be specific for the region. Following complex systems theory, three questions will be asked for every case. First, how do

the circular systems develop over time? Second, were there apparent feedback-mechanisms? Third, are the perspectives of all stakeholders taken into account? Following first now are general descriptions of the cases, and key lessons learned.

4.3.1 The Canada–Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers

Since 1974 the "Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme" (originating in 1966) facilitates the temporal access of Mexican workers "to alleviate labour shortages experienced by fruit and vegetable farmers since World War II".¹³⁶ After more than twenty-five years of experience the alleged success of this programme might hold valuable advice for future practices. In the last years of the 1990s about 5,000 Mexican workers have participated yearly, most of them to harvest crops.

The Canadian government administers the programme but the operations are financed by a cooperative service, paid by the farmers through a user-fee. Loans and working conditions are strictly negotiated by Canadian and Mexican governments. Workers are paid at least the official minimum wage and are provided with free housing and health insurance, free transport back to Mexico and within Canada (costs which are partly reimbursed from salaries). Income taxes are withheld from salaries exceeding a certain minimum. Workers are selected based on experience but also on their needs; Mexicans with poor prospects in their own country are preferred. To ensure that workers return, workers with families are preferred over single workers. The minimum age is 25, and very few women take part. After the first year, earnings of which are usually needed to pay off debts made to cover initial costs of participation in the first place, workers are able to remit up to \$6,000 from an eight-month working period.

Basok (2003) has gained insight in the lives of a number of participants, by interviewing over 300 Mexicans in 11 communities, primarily on the way they spend their earnings. While she found differences between the different communities, she also found that the large majority of Mexican workers indeed do return frequently.¹³⁷ Although Basok does not use the term, this makes Canadian–Mexican migration through this programme clearly circular migration in the sense of what policy makers describe as repeated temporal labour migration. On the much-debated issue of return, Basok (2000b: 232) has important conclusions. She asks why Mexicans working in Canada do nearly all return while –as put forward in the next section– Mexican workers in the US show high numbers of defection. Three reasons she finds decisive. First the well-administered selection procedures of the Canadian programme provide the participants with the security that they can return next season to the same employer. Second, minimum standards in employment and housing conditions were set *and enforced* in Canada, ensuring commitment from individual workers to employers. In the US these rights were violated frequently. Third, relative small programme-scale and (subsequent) absence of substantial

¹³⁶ Basok 2003: 7

¹³⁷ Basok 2000b: 232

migrant networks forming migration specific capital reduced possibilities for Mexican workers to be absorbed in illegal circuits. The following analysis of Mexican workers in the US will reveal more differences.

4.3.2 *Braceros: Mexican workers in the United States*

A much larger group of circular migrants from Mexico has been working in the United States, initially as a way to gain support from Mexico by offering jobs to Mexicans during World War II, through the 1942–1964 Bracero¹³⁸ Programme. About 4,6 million Mexicans have worked in the US as seasonal workers in agriculture during this period (Figure 9). As with the Canadian–Mexican programme, there were “rules that required employers to pay transportation, provide housing, and pay the higher of prevailing or minimum wages”¹³⁹ As the US population grew during the 1950s though, farmers used political pressure to relax these rules. Still Massey (1987: 1372) concludes, “the probability of repeat migration increases with each US trip and is primarily affected by characteristics of the prior trip”. With Basok (2003) Massey observes that only ownership of a house in Mexico is a decisive factor for repeat migration (instead of permanent settlement). Other personal variables, like marriage, having children or land-ownership play a minor role. Massey (1987: 1372) shows how Mexican–US migration is self-perpetuating. Economic differences are not sufficient to explain the huge waves of migration. The US–Mexican case proves that migration is also determined by social factors internal to the migration process. It is the social infrastructure formed by previous migrants that forms *migration specific capital* in the form of knowledge and social networks that induces the migration process to be expanding over time. “Migrant networks form to support migration on a mass basis.”¹⁴⁰ Illegal migration coincides with the Bracero Programme in a striking way. During the programme the number of Mexicans detained for illegal stay in the US rose, with the number of braceros, to a number even higher than that of the participants. A final feature of the Bracero programme is that still many Mexicans repeatedly return, and that “[e]ven among those who have lived abroad for a long time, many eventually [permanently] return to live and work in their home communities.”¹⁴¹ The largest part of the Mexican workers indeed did return, although the number of illegal migrants increased further when the programme was abolished in 1964. Especially during the 1980s, when border controls were tightened, the number of irregular migrants *increased*. Border controls did not stop Mexicans from coming, but reduced their willingness to return. In 1980, the average duration of stay was three years. In the late 1990s the duration had increased to nine years.¹⁴² This point is strengthened by Cornelius and Salehyan (2007), who found that “tougher border controls have had remarkably little influence on the propensity to migrate

¹³⁸ Bracero means ‘strong arms’ (Martin 2003: 11)

¹³⁹ Martin 2003: 11


¹⁴⁰ Massey 1987: 1375

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*

¹⁴² Constant and Zimmerman 2007: 2

illegally to the USA. Political restrictions on immigration are far outweighed by economic and family-related incentives to migrate.”¹⁴³

Figure 9 – Mexican workers in US during Bracero programme



Source: INS Statistical yearbook quoted in Martin 2003, 7.

4.3.3 *Gastarbeiter* in Germany

The German *Gastarbeiter* programme originates in the 1950s, and continued until rising oil prices in 1973 slowed down the global economy. During the programme almost all immigrants (18.5 million) were labour migrants. Of those 18.5 million over 75 percent rotated and eventually returned home as anticipated.¹⁴⁴ The labour was needed because Europe’s economic position made it the “global factory” of its days.¹⁴⁵ There was not much debate over the programme because it was believed that the labour needs were temporary, the domestic labour force was shrinking fast, and unions secured equal rights for foreign and native workers. Most of all it was widely believed that guestworkers would eventually return or move on in a unified Europe based on freedom of movement.¹⁴⁶ Starting with Italy in 1955, Germany signed contracts with 7 ‘recruitment countries’: Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.”¹⁴⁷ The 25 percent who eventually stayed did so because both employers and the migrants themselves saw incentives that countered the programme’s objectives. Martin (2003: 10) labels these phenomena *distortion* and *dependence*. While the intention was that *Gastarbeiter* would not stay for more than three years, employers could save themselves time and money to train new employees if existing workers would be allowed to overstay. Migrants themselves found out that they could not live on a Turkish budget while living in Germany, so

¹⁴³ Cornelius, Wayne A. and Salehyan, Idean 2007

¹⁴⁴ Martin 2003: 8

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.: 9

¹⁴⁶ This believe in the end was not entirely unfounded because “In the southern European countries that joined the EU, labor emigration pressure fell as expected, but not in other [non-EU, S] recruitment countries.” (Martin 2003: 10)

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

they needed more time to reach their saving targets. Their dependency on the German jobs increased with the time they spent in Germany. While migrants overstayed the general idea in policy circles was that return was the rule, because social scientists consistently “reported that most wanted to return”.¹⁴⁸

As the *Gastarbeiter* policies were halted in 1973 and about a quarter of the migrant workers had stayed, contrary to what had been expected, family formation and reunion in the following years resulted in a steady inflow of people. During the 1980s more small-scale programmes were developed to facilitate demand for seasonal labour. Under the ‘Project-tied’ worker programme migrants could stay up to two years for mainly construction projects. An admissions ceiling had been set at 56,000 workers per year. For shorter term needs a ‘seasonal worker’ programme “admits migrants for up to 90 days if local workers are not available to fill vacant jobs in agriculture, forestry, and seasonal hotels.”¹⁴⁹ Of the almost 300,000 seasonal migrants in 2002, about 90 percent were Poles.¹⁵⁰ The programme was administered by local labour offices, which first test the local labour market and then negotiate working conditions, wages and housing and travel arrangements, and payroll-taxes are to be paid. What can be considered a return-incentive is that “employers may request migrants by name, and they do for about 90 percent of the time.”¹⁵¹ Martin (2003: 20) describes how for administration of seasonal worker schemes employers themselves are increasingly trusted. As is the case in Canada, where a user-fee organization takes care of hiring, in Germany worker representatives are seldom involved in programme design or administration.

4.3.4 The Spanish *Contingente* system

Spain officially admits foreign workers, mostly through the *Contingente*-system, introduced in 1993. Under the government-administered programme a limited number of workers is issued one year or longer-term work permits. Workers can enter for up to nine consecutive months, and after four years of seasonal work they can choose to obtain permanent working permits or continue in circularity. Workers are to be “protected by minimum wage and other laws, accrue social security and retirement benefits, and earn vacation benefits. Spanish employers are responsible for providing their transportation and lodging.”¹⁵² As unemployment rates in Spain are still quite high, reaching 30 percent in certain provinces, relatively few *contingente* permits are issued. Of the permits used in 2002, 60 percent went to Poles and 20 percent to Moroccans.¹⁵³

Since 1999 Spain has another, more regional, circular migration programme for the fruit industry in the province of Cartaya. Lacking success in return rates, recently a

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.: 10

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.: 13

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.: 13

¹⁵¹ Ibid.: 13

¹⁵² Arango and Martin 2005: 267

¹⁵³ Ibid.

quite extreme way of ensuring circulation has been tried. In 2007, only women with children were selected, but the children were *not* allowed to come. This caused return rates to rise from 5 percent to 85 percent.¹⁵⁴ The social effects of this family separation are not being considered.

In 2002, migrants and employers alike seemed to prefer irregular working arrangements. Even after a large-scale legalization campaign entitling nearly half million people citizens rights, there were “an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 illegal migrants.”¹⁵⁵ Legal and illegal status are rather fluid in Spain, where a switch from one employer to another can result in loss of regular status.¹⁵⁶ It seems that circular migration through the *contingente* system is very limited, while irregular labour arrangements are more rule than exception. The prevalent circle is that illegal migrants, from Africa and South America but increasingly from Eastern Europe, continue to find jobs at low wages on a considerable scale, which then again leads to “pressures for future legalizations”.¹⁵⁷ Still the Spanish case has some promising *good practices* to show. Workers’ unions increasingly support home communities, and help migrant workers by informing them on their rights, and organizing social and cultural activities.¹⁵⁸

4.3.5 Circular Migration in North Africa

Circular migration in East and Northern Africa has been researched on completely different assumptions. In their extensive work on international migration, while aiming to provide the field with a “fuller theoretical understanding of [...] contemporary international migration [...] throughout the world”¹⁵⁹, Massey *et al.* did not spend even a partial chapter on African migration systems, while all other regions of the world receive specific attention. Rather, the African and other developing regions are treated as ‘sending communities’, of which the household the migrant originates from is the unit of analysis.¹⁶⁰ As a result of the focus of the research by for example Massey *et al.*, African migration history, especially regarding internal migration and cultural aspects, is heavily neglected.¹⁶¹ As concluded while laying the groundwork for a circular migration theory in chapter 3.4, conceptualizing sending communities from the developing world like that induces the risk of stigmatizing migrants from these communities as underdeveloped people. To try to

¹⁵⁴ Migration Policy Institute (2008).

¹⁵⁵ Arango and Martin 2005: 265

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*: 269

¹⁵⁸ MPI 2008: 8

¹⁵⁹ Massey *et al.* 1998: vii

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*: 255.

¹⁶¹ Of course, research on migration in the African context is scarce compared to the rich pool of data and theory available for the developed world. See for a discussion on available research Massey *et al.* 1998: 258. Still, a quick search for literature on migration in the African context shows that since the 1990s research on African migration has been expanding; Google Scholar has 8,000 articles on “migration AND Africa” in the 1980s against some 24,000 in the 1990s. (Google Scholar at <http://scholar.google.com>, 19 September 2008).

avoid this danger, and to attain some understanding of African migration tradition, history and practice, now three studies on East and North African (circular) migration will be discussed.

Walter Elkan in 1967 wrote on “Circular Migration and the Growth of Towns in East Africa”. At the time, the country of Uganda whereupon Elkan based most of his findings is just into its fifth year of independence from British colonial rule. Elkan describes how in the process of urban growth just setting in at that time people seem to perpetuate their age-old tradition of temporary migration; with the move to the cities there is “another and important movement back to the countryside”.¹⁶² Elkan ascribes the growth of towns in East Africa to an increase in the number of migrants and an increase in the period spent in towns, but finds “nothing to indicate that there has been any basic change in the pattern of circular migration”.¹⁶³ Many town-dwellers go to the town to earn a living but “continue to have close connections with their villages of origin.”¹⁶⁴

For this circularity there are explanations from the cultural, economical and policy realms. Reasons for people to temporarily move to town are that during some time working away from home has traditionally been an initiation rite. Second, it can be the only way people can earn extra money, for example to pay a tax or start a (agricultural) business. A reason for workers not to stay in the cities is that working conditions were often very poor. Governments could not or did not provide for “necessary provisions to enable people to become permanent wage earners”¹⁶⁵, certainly not in the way for example the UK government provided housing for the working class at the start of the industrial age. As a result in the 1950s and 1960s there was no development of an African working class in the Western sense. But before all that, wages simply were low compared to what could be earned with cash crops in the country. Circular migration in the East African context, Elkan concludes, serves at his time as a “process that lowers the costs of development”,¹⁶⁶ and has no tendency to lead to mass urban settlement.

Adepoju (2007) discussed a number of current issues in international migration in and from Africa. What stands out is that numeric data is lacking, so Adepoju draws general conclusions that in some cases are based just on anecdotal evidence. Still his findings can be valuable to this discussion. Circulation is increasing, he notes, and destinations are diversifying. Because of limited opportunities to travel to the traditional Northern labour-receiving countries people, man as well as women, increasingly migrate to the Gulf region or the US. Also migration within Africa is growing, as economies like those of Gabon, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are booming. People from the Western parts of Africa often migrate temporarily as small traders, commercial migrants, especially to Zambia and South Africa. Skilled

¹⁶² Elkan 1967: 581

¹⁶³ Ibid.: 583

¹⁶⁴ Elkan 1967: 581

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.: 586

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.: 589

professionals, including large and increasing numbers of women, migrate in large numbers but not anymore just to Europe, Africa and the Gulf region; increasingly professionals find destinations in developing parts of Africa itself. Thus brain drain converts into brain circulation at a continental level, which would suggest that on a country scale brain drain could still be impeding economic growth and development like especially in the case of medical professionals.¹⁶⁷ Adepoju (2007) finds that irregular migration is increasingly problematic, although numbers are unknown or at least heavily debated. Within Africa most notably South-Africa has an estimated 1.5 million undocumented migrants, and moving out of the continent migrants are finding ever “more inventive ways” to cross the borders to Europe or the US. Europe’s still increasingly restricted border policies have at least two unwanted side effects. Migrants’ journeys are becoming more dangerous, especially in the North because both the Sahara and the Mediterranean Sea are dangerous to cross under unfavourable conditions. Second, human trafficking is becoming an industry, with mafia-like syndicates in for example Libya gaining money and power from often-desperate migrants.¹⁶⁸ Adepoju concludes that with the expected growth of the African labour force, the creation of jobs is a necessity to provide a future outlook for the youth. Job creation is dependent on economic development, which is hindered by global agricultural subsidies, conflict and violence, and other factors. Lacking possibilities for employment and economic growth, young people are increasingly willing to try their luck abroad. Adepoju concludes that under the circumstances opening up “avenues for temporary regular migration” is desirable in order to alleviate sorrow for desperate African youth; a plea for increasing legal CM opportunities.

On North African migration systems in general,¹⁶⁹ Hein de Haas (2006a) wrote a detailed analysis. De Haas follows the periods of pre-colonization, colonization, guest worker boom, oil crisis, 1991 Gulf war and diversifying labour migration to Southern Europe in the 1990s. He describes how most North African countries, from the Maghreb via Libya towards Egypt, probably go through a migration transition just as most countries in Western Europe did in the 19th and first half of the 20th century. In the pre-colonial period, circular seasonal movement characterized migration as nomadic groups travelled in between summer and winter pastures. Modernization and colonization led to urbanization, probably following circular patterns as Elkan (1967) indicated. Interestingly, in the guest worker period between 1950 and 1973 emigration from North African countries was *restricted* by their governments. The guest worker period as described from Germany’s point of view before, is being considered as an opportunity by other sending countries just the same; “Tunisia and

¹⁶⁷ Adepoju (2007) shows how in some countries over 60 percent of the medical professionals have left their country after finishing education.

¹⁶⁸ Although De Haas (2007a) notes that the majority of traffickers works in small groups and not in large international syndicates.

¹⁶⁹ De Haas (2006a) makes explicit reservations about the universality of his findings and conclusions, as the North African system is very heterogeneous and can hardly be considered as one system. Therefore here the plural *systems* will be used.

in particular Morocco pursued strongly pro-emigration policies, in the expectation that their countries would greatly benefit from the experience, training and financial resources of migrants, which were expected to return.”¹⁷⁰

After the 1973 oil crisis, the Gulf states would take over Europe’s role as recruiting region. Especially Egypt changed its policies profoundly, as Sadat released migration restrictions. “Temporary migration became to be seen a means to alleviate demographic pressures and stimulate economic growth.”¹⁷¹ As a result, in 1983 an estimated 3,3 million Egyptians worked abroad, mainly in the Gulf region.¹⁷² In Libya the discovery of oil in 1959 induced considerable migration from Egypt and the Mahgreb as well. Socialist Algeria, with some oil reserves, forbid all emigration partially because it was considered to induce post-colonial dependence. In the meantime, and “notwithstanding significant return migration, [a] large number of Maghrebi migrants ended up staying permanently”¹⁷³ in Europe. Return programmes, from Europe as well as from Algeria and Tunisia, largely failed because lack of economic opportunities. Just as observed in the Mexican-US case, restrictive European immigration policies reached the opposite effect with existing labour migrants: “Many Maghrebi migrants decided to settle not so much despite but because of the increasingly restrictive immigration policies. Prospective return migrants feared that they would not be allowed to go back to the receiving countries”.¹⁷⁴ Family migration and irregular migration kept a persistent flow of migrants from the Mahgreb into Western Europe in place until the early 1990s. At that time the 1991 Gulf War led to “massive forced repatriation”¹⁷⁵ from the Gulf states. Directly after the Gulf War though, migration continued and analogue to the European experience many workers from Egypt stayed. In Algeria the 1991 civil war led to increased refugee and labour migration into Europe. In Libya, the U.N. arms embargo led Al-Qadhafi to “encourage sub-Saharan Africans to work in Libya”,¹⁷⁶ turning his country into a destination and transit zone. Migration towards Europe persisted, especially through family formation, while labour migration increased again from 1995 when a sudden growth in “export-oriented agriculture, construction and tourism” generated an “increasing demand for seasonal, flexible and low-skilled labour”.¹⁷⁷ Increasing border restrictions around 1990 did not reduce this migration flow but pushed it into irregular, undocumented and more long-term movements. Spain and Italy in this period repeatedly granted legal status to large parts of the irregular workers. Two recent trends in emigration from North African countries stand out: the fact that the majority of higher educated move not to Europe but to the US and Canada, and a feminization. An increasing number of women migrates to

¹⁷⁰ De Haas 2006a: 71

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.: 72

¹⁷³ Ibid.: 73

¹⁷⁴ De Haas 2006a: 73

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.: 74

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.: 75

¹⁷⁷ Fargues 2004: 1357 in De Haas 2006a: 76

Europe as a result of first increasing levels of education and emancipation on the one hand, and an increasing demand for jobs in the informal service sector in Europe¹⁷⁸ on the other. Finally, immigration into the region is extensive as well. Libya for example hosts 1,5 to 2,5 million migrants (legal and illegal), accounting for 20 to 30 percent of its population,¹⁷⁹ but numbers, especially on undocumented migration, again are very unreliable. Immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa, sparked by Libya in the 1990s, continues, exemplified by Egypt hosting the world's largest refugee population which is estimated at between 0.5 and 3 million people.¹⁸⁰

De Haas, having experience and knowledge of the Moroccan situation, made a thorough analysis of migration movements by the large group of Moroccan expatriates.¹⁸¹ Although many of them are believed to have migrated permanently, most do return often for vacation to Morocco. After the Moroccan government made it easier to temporarily return in order to secure ties to the home countries and thus the huge flow of remittances, about 2.2 million of Moroccans return for summer holidays. This is about the total number of Moroccans in Europe. It is no exaggeration to state that this turns the great majority of Moroccans into circular migrants.

4.4 Analysis

4.4.1 What is circular migration?

Based on the foregoing description of policy documents and existing practice, what is circular migration? It is most often considered to be a form of labour migration. Although the term just recently entered the international migration discourse, it is not a new phenomenon. Starting from the most general used definition in recent policy proposals and research, *repeat temporary labour migration* has been more rule than exception throughout migration history. In recent, post-World War II history, in the Western countries over 60 percent of migrants from guest worker countries were in fact circular migrants.¹⁸² Policy makers implicitly or explicitly stress return migration, mostly without specifying mechanisms ensuring circularity. In practice, it seems that most seasonal or temporary migration programmes are CM programmes as workers repeatedly engage in them. In most cases circularity is promoted because employers can specify names, which most do.¹⁸³ Irregular circular migration is hard to find in the literature. Martin (2003) speculates that about half of the seasonal workers in Germany work outside of a legal programme.

¹⁷⁸ De Haas 2006a: 79

¹⁷⁹ De Haas 2006a: 84

¹⁸⁰ Zohry and Harrel-Bond 2003: 49 in De Haas 2006a: 84

¹⁸¹ The Moroccans in Europe form by far the greatest national group from North-Africa, with over 2.5 million Moroccans in Europe and almost 0.5 million in other places like the U.S. and Canada; a total of over 10 percent of the population.

¹⁸² Constant and Zimmerman 2007: 16

¹⁸³ 70 percent of Canadian employers and 90 percent of German employers do ask for people they hired in previous years.

Not only data on irregular circular migration is scarce. “It is impossible to come to any agreed estimate on the number of people engaging in circular migration”, Agunias and Newland¹⁸⁴ conclude. It can be argued that the definitions of circular migration in most policy documents are more based on wishful thinking than induced from an actual and well-researched empirical phenomenon. With the exception of a House of Commons (2004) report, all ideas appear to bear down to ‘repairing’ guestworker-programmes from the 1960s and early 1970s; their main focus is on securing return, and a number of return-incentives is central in the arrangements. The focus on return adds a dimension to the implicit definition of the CM concept. From the contexts of most policy documents, the definition of CM could very well be broadened to *temporary labour migration with forced return and possibility of repeat*, the House of Commons (2004) report being the only exception.

General arguments found in policy proposals in favour of CM programmes are the fulfilment of labour needs, enabling labour migration without granting citizens rights, development of sending countries through remittances and skills transfer, ensuring return migration, politically viable option for temporary migration when public opinion is opposed, incentive for sending countries to be bargained against preventing illegal migration, and CM as an alternative for potential migrants to illegal migration, mainly through the use of mobility partnerships (Table 9).

Table 9 – Arguments for CM programmes in policy documents

fulfilling labour needs
enabling labour migration without granting citizens rights
development of sending countries through remittances and skills transfer
ensuring return migration
politically viable option for temporary migration when public opinion is opposed
incentive for sending countries to be bargained against preventing illegal migration
alternative for potential migrants to illegal migration (mobility partnerships)

4.4.2 Comparing cases

The selected cases are very diverse and it should be noted that local differences are often underestimated in the larger programmes. While recognizing the risk of generalizations, still some conclusions can be drawn. There is a huge gap between practice and policy making. Because CM is a general feature of developing communities, designing policy should come down to constraining a *de facto* form of mobility, or enabling this mobility that would have been there anyway if borders had been open. The programmes that are most successful in terms of reaching repeat circulation are those with less migrants (about 5,000 per year) with shorter periods

¹⁸⁴ MPI 2007: 4

(not exceeding one year) that fall into Massey *et alia's* (1998) initiation phase. Two factors reduce circulation: strict border enforcement and a lack of migrant networks. Both lead to less circulation, either through distortion effects (employers counting on the cheap labour) or reduced certainty about future circulation options by migrants. Dependency effects can be observed or expected with all programmes, but probably do not lead to extensive permanent migration, if future options for repeat can be expected.

Policy does start from labour needs, and does not anticipate the changes of labour supply and development in sending areas over time. Labour frontiers are treated as a given, and considered more as leading to problems of illegal migration than as opportunities for hard-needed labour and signposts of development. Development is in general narrowly defined, as will be further discussed in the next chapter. Future changes of phases of development are not anticipated in policy making. As a result the political viability of more yearly quota can be expected to be exceedingly low.

A tendency can be observed towards smaller programmes. The experiences with the Canadian programme and other smaller programmes indicate this is a positive development. There is a suspected relationship between border permeability and optimum programme size. As borders are perceived as harder to cross, large programmes are difficult to maintain, because networks facilitating migration specific social capital will form more easily.

Table 10 – Circular migration in practice

	Canada–Mexico	<i>Braceros</i>	<i>Gastarbeiter</i> , Project/Seasonal	Contingente	N–Africa
Geographic area	Mexico–Canada	Mexico–US	Germany ¹⁸⁵	Spain	North Africa
Period	1974 – ongoing	1942 –1964	1955–1973, 1980–	1993 –	–
Average period	8 months	3 years	2 years / 90 days	9 months	–
Key dimensions	Seasonal farm labour. Small farms. 5,000 people yearly.	Seasonal farm labour. Large farms. 200,000 people yearly.	Temporary industrial labour.	Seasonal farm labour. 10.000 people yearly.	Long tradition of nomadic migration. Scarcely researched.
Workers' rights	Partially negotiated and fairly enforced	Negotiated but less enforced	Negotiated by German labour unions & enforced	Unknown	Undocumented
Return incentives	Families at home. Guarantee to be able to re–enter.	Families at home.	Family for some. No effective return policies; just lip service	Not specified. Naturalization after three years in programme	Fertile grounds. Economic opportunities in villages.
Return rates	> 90%	About 75%	About 75%	Unknown	–
Successes	Effective rotation	Labour supply and high remittances	Labour supply and fair remittances	Part labour demand solved	Mobility as survival strategy

¹⁸⁵ Germany signed contracts with Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia

Failures	High dependency, some abuse by employers	High defection, doubtful labour circumstances	Unexpected permanent settlement	Not able to counter irregular migrant 'supply'	-
Development over time? Feedback? Stakeholders' agency?	Bi-lateral evaluations Canada-Mexico. All stakeholders exercise agency.	Sharply upscaled in second en ninth years. Not equally negotiated; workers large incentive to defect	No strong monitoring or feedback in policy-design. Workers increasingly found opportunities to stay.	Little cooperation. Little development, as employers prefer irregular migrants	No managed programmes. After WWII first emigration restrictions, later encouragement as remittances grew.

Sources: see text

All programmes discussed resemble guest worker programmes, the *Gastarbeiter* programme being the defining example. It can be questioned to what extent CM programmes differ from guest worker programmes. Comparing policy ideas with cases, two important differences appear. First, current programmes focus stronger on home country interests. Second, the quality of the migration experience can be expected to be different than that in the 1960s because both communication and transport facilities have significantly improved leading to more transnational ties. This can be expected to strengthen both emotional ties to the home community and the exchange of money and knowledge, but also to facilitate migrant networks even more. Stephen Castles (2006) takes this analysis further. Another difference between 'then' and 'now' is that now predominantly high-skilled workers are admitted for longer-term contracts. Low-skilled labour is left out, and according to Castles "[t]hus there is every reason to think that much labour demand will continue to be met by undocumented workers, who undergo considerable risks on the journey and face exploitation on arrival."¹⁸⁶

The validity of this claim can be questioned on different grounds though. In Europe temporal workers from North African and South American countries are fast being replaced by workers from 'accession states' in Eastern Europe. This marks an important shift. In Spain the author has been told¹⁸⁷ how jobs that used to be done by North African workers are increasingly being done by mostly Poles. The UK Home Office (2006) assumes that all low-skilled demand can be met by entries from accession states (including Romania and Bulgaria).

4.5 Social downsides, denial of agency and Universal Human Rights

After comparing the cases, questions remain. What are the potential downsides? And then, to what extent is CM a viable policy strategy? This last question will be answered in the next chapter, answers to the first question follow here.

¹⁸⁶ Castles 2006: 28

¹⁸⁷ He was told by an anonymous migrant, but quantitative evidence has not been found.

Downsides are to be expected in human rights violations and unwanted social effects in both home and host countries. These effects are seldom accounted for in both research and policies. This section will discuss human rights violations and social downsides. It will be argued that both lack of attention for social downsides as for agency can be considered as symptoms of a dehumanization of migrants in policy documents.

The simple question remaining unanswered throughout is what it means for a man or woman to migrate (temporarily). The act of migration is obviously an influential decision in the life of the average migrant. In the case of labour migrants, as families are often left behind, it means separation from loved ones and friends, familiar places and local traditions. Constant and Zimmerman (2007: 1) report “disastrous effects for families”, which is not only a social inconveniency but also violates article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁸⁸

It can be beneficial for a *country* to employ one or more of its citizens in another country, or to receive citizens of another country on a temporal basis. But how is it for a *person* to live in different places on a regular basis? Tanya Basok (2003: 20) speaks in the last sentence of her paper on the Canadian–Mexican programme of “psychological toll” of family separation offsetting some of the economic benefits. While this is a subjective toll, to be experienced and evaluated by different individuals in different ways, it should be understood that workers depart from an unequal situation compared to that of their hosts. While some might anyway choose to explore labour markets abroad, it is probable that many would choose to work closer to their families if economic opportunities would exist. Constant and Zimmerman (2007: 1) cite Tienda and Diaz (1987) who argue that “circular migration [to the United States] can be disastrous for families, employment and income, when return migrants face high unemployment in the home country and are forced to migrate again”, leading to “a rapid increase in female-headed families, high school dropout rates, and a lack of training and work experience”.

In the next chapter it will be asked to what extent the ethical downsides are worth the gains in terms of development. Even apart from this moral point, the migrants’ experience and desires are critical for the success of migration programmes; if migrants do not appreciate a programme there often is the option of illegal migration. This feature of migrant agency is, as has been shown before, seldom the starting point for policy making. In practice it is often possible to overstay. The Spanish Cartaya programme¹⁸⁹ raises family separation to the level of government policy, as women are only allowed on the programme if they both have children and leave them behind. Again this is a violation of article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The degree to which Universal Human Rights are protected is bound to be controversial. This is because the starting point is already a violation of the articles

¹⁸⁸ Refer to 2.1.5.

¹⁸⁹ It has been described in 4.3.4

13, 15 and 23 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as stated in 2.1.5 on (international) legal aspects of migration. The violation of articles 13 and 15 is ambiguous and heavily dependent on interpretation (although from poor countries' view this interpretation may differ widely from the Western view), but violation of article 23 is blatant: African workers are not protected against unemployment, equal work across the European–African border is not equally paid, remuneration is not just and favourable as many African people can not support their families, and the formation of trade unions by either documented or undocumented migrant workers is not widespread and probably very difficult.

Castles (2006:28) goes a step further, suggesting that the richer societies knowingly and explicitly exploit workers from poorer countries. He calls it “[t]he great hypocrisy of modern migration policy (one shared by the USA and Japan): the systematic use of undocumented migrant workers, who are denied many of the rights laid down in the human rights instruments and labour conventions endorsed by these same countries. Building walls (between the USA and Mexico) and increasing naval patrols (between the EU and Africa) increases the death rate and the smugglers’ profits, but does not solve the problem.” Although undocumented migrants play a role in Western economies, it can be asked to what extent this is a result or side-effect of these policies, or that the problem of undocumented migration is just difficult to solve. In any case it makes the development of effective migration policy even more important.

Dependency on migration programmes can be another unwanted side effect.¹⁹⁰ As people raise their standard of living and expectations ‘at home’ grow, it becomes more difficult to stop working abroad even if negative effects increase. A more problematic form of dependency can emerge if migrants take loans to initially engage in a programme. If the creditors are not forgiving working abroad can easily resemble forced labour. This is another reason why it is crucial to be very careful in considering working conditions when designing circular migration policies.

A structural denial of migrant’s agency is reflected in the treatment of return in most programmes, the Canadian–Mexican programme being the exception. A large majority of migrants eventually want to return. “Many migrants have no desire to stay permanently, as long as the option of return is open to them”.¹⁹¹ And as long as the option of re-entry remains open, as the Mexican and other cases show, the more borders are perceived to be closed, the less migrants will return. Given closed borders of the European Union, the return goals stated in EU policy seem to be wishful policy thinking. Though the large majority of migrants can be expected to want to return to their families and place of birth, closing borders and unwanted effects of distortion and (migrants) dependence¹⁹² will lower the number of returnees. Furthermore return seems to be more likely after a five or ten year period,

¹⁹⁰ Basok (2000), Martin (2003)

¹⁹¹ Castles 2006: 29

¹⁹² See 4.3.3

because in the short timeframes of most CM programmes migrants generally do not have earned enough to offset the costs of migration. (UN 2006: 68–69).

Constant and Zimmerman (2007: 3) argue, like Massey (1987) does for the US–Mexican case, that circular, repeat migration movements develop because of the creation of migration specific capital. The nature of this capital remains unspecified. They analyse the reasons for repeat migration from the migrant’s point of view, implicitly acknowledging migrants’ agency. They propose five reasons why migrants may want to circulate (Table 11).

Table 11 – Reasons for circulation

Optimizing social, economic and personal situation at every period
Minimizing psychic costs due to long separation from family
Preference for frequent change of location
Keep options open in home and host countries
Reduce risks of long-term commitment

From this point of view CM is an optimization and risk reduction strategy for migrants. In this process opportunities and restrictions all put in their weight. It is another explanation for the observation that circulation is reduced as border restrictions are tightened. But most importantly it humanizes the ‘objects’ of the policies. Apart from ethical advantages, this also has practical consequences. In the next chapter it will be argued that migrants can probably have a much larger role in creating viable (circular) migration systems. But before moving on, it will be asked who the circular migrant might be.

4.6 Who could be the circular migrant

The analysis of policy and practice of circular migration has shown that only in one policy document¹⁹³ an attempt has been made at describing who the circular migrant might be. And although there are guestworkers from widely different backgrounds and in varying lines of work, existing African circular migrants in Europe are to be found outside of legal programmes and perhaps mostly outside of any legal boundary. No systematic research through interviews or censuses has been conducted in these groups. The interviews opening the chapters of this thesis might provide the reader with a preliminary idea about who they could be and how diverse the group of potential circular migrants is. Although by no means representative, they are still included because theory from the previous chapter puts migrants’ perceptions on the forefront of defining system dimensions.

Their stories give an impression of how, like with Mr. Ba, ties with family members in the home countries evolve and how far people like Omar Parfait can go

¹⁹³ The UN (2007) report, please refer to 4.2

in their searches for better lives. The stories also show that even after many years in another country people like Korotou still foster the wish to return to their home country. Djiby Diop went a long way, lost his money, and now suffers from a strong shame to go back empty handed. An insight is provided through Mamadou's story in the insecure labour conditions many irregular migrants face, and how important it will be for the European human rights record to include provisions like health insurance in policy projects. The following chapter is a quest for more credible policy design.

Mamadou Diallo

Mamadou (27) harvests tomatoes, pumpkins and gourds in the greenhouses on the Spanish Costa del Sol. In the city of Roquetas de Mar he lives in between the greenhouses, with twenty young men like himself. All without papers, without social security or even medical insurance. His dream when he came to Europe was to become rich. Earning €800 to €1200 per month he has enough to send something home. That is to say, if there is work. Now heavy snowfall has destroyed the tomatoes and economic crisis worsened things. Of all twenty young guys only about four or five have work.

To find a job you just ride your bicycle and wait on street corners for farmers looking for hands to stop and pick you. For those who can't work, solidarity serves as insurance, but the strong social structures taken from Africa do fade away to some extent. Competition amongst the young



workers grows as it is increasingly impossible for the five working men to support all twenty of them. Now if one cannot pay the rent he has to leave the house. Mamadou ascertains that in Africa, this would never happen.

Still his hope is to get rich and return. Return to Senegal and start a family, build a business, to help more people to survive. His hopes were really very high. Right now his chances are ambiguous. Last month, two of his housemates have died of illness while not being able to pay for medical help. Each month, if possible, the men donate to a fund. With saving from this fund they were able to send the bodies back home. This is as far as solidarity reaches these days.

The meal I had to pay for before Mamadou allows an interview is shared with all twenty, and the atmosphere is actually quite positive.

5 Circular Migration for Development?

In this chapter, the relationship between CM and development will be described in light of the emerging discourse of human mobility within the development debate.¹⁹⁴ First, a relatively new circular migration programme is introduced; a Dutch pilot project that is aiming to stimulate development. Then the leading question will be rephrased making use of the previously developed theoretical frame. Next an 'ideal' CM programme design is sketched with estimates of its effects on development, to work towards a general assessment framework for these programmes. This framework in turn will be applied to the Dutch pilot project, to get an impression of its practical applicability and the pilot project's potential effects on development. Moving towards general conclusions in the last chapter, the rephrased question will be answered for the specific case of the Dutch pilot project.

5.1 Recent regulated Circular Migration initiatives

Following Kofi Annan's triple win idea a number of CM programmes is emerging. It is way too early to evaluate them since most are only in pilot phases. Although it is too early to evaluate, two of these projects will be used to lift the argument of this thesis beyond mere theory. Also this will provide the reader with an insight in what is going on in the policy field.

A recent Dutch pilot project will be described in some detail below, based on a policy-letter the Dutch minister for development cooperation sent to the Dutch House of Representatives on 20 November 2009. Two other projects will only be mentioned here, both on a regional European level. The European Union has set up two 'mobility partnerships' with the specific goals to set up circular migration programmes, one with the Cape Verde Island and another with Mali. The Capeverdian programme is more specifically focused on circular migration, including temporary return migration of citizens living in European countries. The trial will last three years, and is carried out by the Capeverdian, Portuguese, Spanish, Luxembourg, and French governments. The focus is on the prevention of undocumented migration, while creating opportunities for both permanent and "temporary circular" migration.¹⁹⁵ Migrants will have no social security, no pension fund, and no specified health insurance provisions.

In both countries a migration centre is part of the strategy. The Capeverdian centre is to be in Cidade de Paria, and will accept applications for short stay visa. The Malinese centre will not issue visas. It was opened in the capital Bamako in October 2008. Based on the centre's website and a short interview with its director,¹⁹⁶ what stands out is that the circular migration approach is part of a much broader strategy of job creation in the region and informing would-be migrants. The pilot status of the

¹⁹⁴ As seen in chapter 2.

¹⁹⁵ <http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=42769> (18 December 2009)

¹⁹⁶ See Appendix C for a transcript in Dutch

centre is obvious; four months after its opening six people have found a job in the region through the centre, and no-one has still found a job in Europe, six are on a list for a project in Spain. The centre has not specified what it considers as 'circular migration'. The centre is funded with €10 million from the European Development Fund.¹⁹⁷ It has been criticized by migrant organizations for being a border control project funded with development money, and for helping to create 'Kleenex workers', "workers to be disposed of after use like a paper tissue".¹⁹⁸

The Dutch pilot project is to be carried out by a publicly funded NGO, the 'HIT Foundation', after public tender in July 2009. Costs are covered by a governmental subsidy of €3,8 million. Cornerstone of the approach is an emphasis on return, with a 'personal development plan' for every participant that will be tailored towards this goal. The foundation will try to find new labour opportunities, and aims to support the participants with founding their own companies in their birth countries. Evaluation of the project will be carried out by the World Bank Development Research Group.

The pilot will facilitate two groups of a maximum of 80 persons from Indonesia and South Africa who will learn and be employed in the Netherlands for at most two years. Industry sectors for employment will be selected through analysis by the governmental organization for social security insurance UWV. Estimates are that jobs are needed in metal industry, food industry, agriculture and logistics, but this estimate will be updated regularly.

Return is being considered crucial for the success or failure of the project. Main instrument to ensure return is that migrants should learn competences that are scarce in the birth country so they can earn income there, and support for finding jobs or starting a business. The aim is to make the migrants more self-sufficient and develop their potential, and help their countries develop through their contributions. Family reunion will not be allowed in the project. The first migrants are expected to reach the Netherlands in the summer of 2010. The pilot ends in November 2012.

In the next section a framework for assessment of this kind of programmes will be developed. The Dutch project will be tested against this framework in 5.2.3.

5.2 Rephrasing the question and developing guidelines for programme design

How would CM lead to development? Building on the previously stated ideas about migration and development forming a complex system, the question now can be redefined. The OECD gives in their report 'Gaining from Migration' a set of

¹⁹⁷ www.cigem.org retrieved on 18 december 2009

¹⁹⁸ http://www.mo.be/index.php?id=63&tx_uwnews_pi2%5Bart_id%5D=22256&cHash=42ad1fb1d5 retrieved on 12 January 2010

recommendations that provide a starting point.¹⁹⁹ They state that “[t]he new system should not be thought of as an immigration system at all: instead, it should be conceptualised as an emerging system of international labour mobility. Those that govern the new mobility system should be willing to shape it.” They urge governments to “engage with migrants and their countries of origin as genuine partners in governing the mobility system; and be willing to adjust immigration postures to reflect both changing circumstances and the results from ongoing evaluations.”²⁰⁰ Those recommendations reflect the need to start with migrants themselves, as deduced from systems theory.

The sought relationship between CM and development in the question how CM *leads to* development, is a causal one. While there are so many interacting variables spanning differing levels of aggregation in the complex migration–development systems, causal relationships will be very hard to prove. The definition of development as “the social and political economic process of societal change in which people’s capabilities grow as they desire, with – if actively pursued like in policy making – the goal to provide a fair minimum level of human security”, would leave room for finding correlations between aspects of migration and ‘capabilities’. As concluded in 3.1.2 causal relations can only be proven retrospectively in complex systems, and can be expected to change within the system very fast. This uncertainty should be dealt with. As it will be so hard to explain causality, it will be asked *when* CM *contributes* to development, without the need to know how or *why* the causal relations exactly work. This is the first redefinition.

As a result the only way to research and develop viable policies is through an iterative process of trial and error. You need simply to try out different options. These rounds of trial and error should be *part of the policies*. The politically hard reality is that, lacking causal evidence, the success or failure of a policy programme can only be described in terms of conjectures, leading to the paradox that acknowledging fundamental uncertainty is the way to improve political credibility.

The second redefinition consists of breaking down the question. What is CM? What is development? Circular Migration here is a regulated form of repeated temporary labour migration. Development is –simplifying the definition arrived at in chapter 2.2– an increase in human freedom and human security in a given period in a given region.

Third, following the principle of iterations from complex systems theory, a time horizon should be included. The time horizon should be finite but long enough to provide necessary hope, as seen in chapter 2.1.4 on the psychology of migration. In order to influence a system through policy those policies should incorporate regular evaluations over time as well as (legal) space to change variables along the way. The question could now be restated as: Under what circumstances can a positive contribution be expected from regulated acts of repeated temporal labour migration

¹⁹⁹ OECD 2007: 24.

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*

to human security and freedom, within what time horizon and geographic region? Finally, because the question addresses *regulated* CM, the ultimate question would be how policy programmes can be designed that lead to this positive contribution. The rephrased question can be found in Box 2.

How can policy programmes be designed that help creating circumstances under which a positive contribution can be expected from regulated acts of repeated temporal labour migration to human freedom and security, within a specified region and time horizon?

Box 2 – Rephrased Research Question

5.2.1 Attempt at Designing Circular Migration policy contributing to Development

Starting from a sketch of what could be a migration system in the African–European context, a potential CM policy scheme will now be drafted. The questions formulated in chapter 4.4 will be used to adapt the scheme to the needs predicted by complex systems theory.

When describing the system, which would largely be defined by its boundaries, the perceptions of the (potential) migrants should be the starting point. From the point of view of for example Diop or Parfait,²⁰¹ a migration system between their country (for example Senegal or Cameroon) and Europe could consist of the following elements:

- the want to improve the life of one’s family, especially your children
- expectations from the (extended) family for him or her to improve life, just like the fellow villager who receives monthly payments from a son in Paris
- the idea that much money can be made in Europe
- stories about successful journeys and the dangers of travelling
- an idea about routes: ‘legally’ through obtaining a visa and ‘illegally’ through paying a ‘travel agent’ for false papers and a journey through the desert and/or over seas
- knowledge of temporary working programmes between Mali and Spain
- a network of relatives in Europe
- the wish to retire at older age in a new to build house in the home country

If a system is described from migrants’ point of view, a regulated circular migration programme must always compete with other options, most notably the option of irregular migration. The European policy makers’ view of the system is unlikely to take this option into full account. His or her idea about the system can be induced from policy papers and research on existing programmes as analysed in the previous chapter, and might contain the following elements:

²⁰¹ The names are used as hypothetical migrants, although their visions and stories are inspired by the real world examples of people with the same names; see 4.6

- the idea that many illegal workers pose a problem
- the idea that the policy makers' country has a certain freedom in developing migration policies but also plays a role in Europe's border policy
- perception of many poor people wanting to enter territory
- problems with filling labour positions at the lower end
- number of vacancies to be filled
- ideas about how temporary migration can be controlled
- perception of a public mistrust and antipathy towards strangers
- public mistrust of guest labour programmes because of historical failures
- perceived need to assure reasonable working conditions
- pressure from NGOs to provide solutions to double standards in working conditions between 'legal' and 'illegal' labour
- pressure from NGOs to offer alternatives for boat migrants
- political need for different approaches of development
- knowledge about magnitude of flows of remittances
- political need to present employers with an alternative for illegal labour in order to maintain international competitive position

Starting from the combined views on what the system looks like, and using the questions and guidelines from theory, a viable programme could contain the following elements:

- 'the deal for migrants': a realistic offer targeted at potential migrants that would look like a serious alternative for irregular migration routes
- 'the deal for employers': a realistic offer targeted at potential employers, offering a serious alternative for irregular workers
- a process of design consisting of a number of iterating rounds in which both employers and potential migrants are consulted
- included in the design process: creation of structure of ownership where employers and -later on- also migrant workers self-govern the programme
- a politically viable vision on 'return', including the acknowledgement that permanent return should not be the goal of the programme and that in the longer term permanent settlement should be offered to participants
- the acknowledgement that in order to facilitate the previous point, host-country domestic social structures will have to be involved and be stimulated to adapt
- the definition of parameters for the number of vacancies to be fulfilled, number of participants, the duration of their stay, the number of visits before which permanent settlement should be allowed, minimum wages, et cetera, and limits for these parameters
- description of some of these parameters as automatic feedback parameters, for example the number of vacancies and (maximum) number of participants can be linked

- a periodic evaluation and reconsideration of these parameters within their limits
- a periodic evaluation and reconsideration of the project itself
- a description of minimum social and working conditions, including housing, healthcare and other insurances
- a 'hope-and-trust principle', stating that rights built up in the programme, like admittance and the eventual right to citizenship, will not be withdrawn for existing participants. Programme changes should not work retrospectively.
- a 'true to life' time horizon for the programme, exceeding common four-year-periods of political office
- enforced periodic return on the one hand, with the right to acquire citizens' rights on the other
- return enforcement based on stimuli (like a savings account that can only be accessed upon return, and prohibition of family reunification). These stimuli should be realistically weighted against the option of default or overstay
- the right to family reunification once citizenship is obtained
- a system of trapped social rights, for example with points on a scale which increases with each year a migrant comes and or goes
- migrants could get the choice to either build up social rights by automatically paying part of their salary to social taxes eventually resulting in full social rights, or investing these savings 'at home' upon return
- it should be acknowledged in the programme description and subsequent communication with all relevant actors that the artificially designed state of controlled mobility is recognised as temporary and undesirable, albeit under the current global political situation the only viable
- it should be acknowledged that under current conditions certain human rights (like the freedom to live where one desires) are violated, and that the programme is a better option from this perspective, but still does not guarantee equal human rights for all; it is a step in the right direction

5.2.2 What's the deal? A framework for circular migration programmes

Using the bullet-pointed sketch of a CM programme, its possible parameters and key elements can be distilled. They are listed and combined with the findings on existing programmes from the previous chapter into a framework for the assessment of new CM policy.

A list of parameters is provided in Table 12. Entries in bold are considered to protect workers positions; they are highlighted because of inherent power discrepancies as argued below.

Table 12 – parameters for CM programmes

Parameters/questions	Values/notes
Fixed	
Parties involved in programme design	Migrants? Employers? Home authorities? Regional partners?
Are migrants consulted in interviews?	Yes/No/How often?
Enforcement of return	Legal provisions
Incentives for return	Exclusion from next 'round', forced savings account, conditional pension/social fund,
Incentives for default	What reasons have or develop participants to quit the programme or to overstay their visa?
Home country perspective assessed	Temporary 'return' also facilitated? etc.
Provisions for re-entry	Guarantee for (right of application for) next rounds
Provisions for permanent citizenship	After how many rounds/years?
Labour sector specified	Specific job position or profession
Permit transferable to other employers	Limits chances for abuse
Can employers ask for specific persons?	Employers prefer to hire same people
Organization and administration	Through employers' cooperative, (semi)government organization, NGO, workers' collective, combination?
Administration finance	Employers? workers? government subsidies?
Minimal Programme duration (nr. of 'rounds')	What is migrants' perspective?
Minimum wages	Needed for return on investment estimates
Feedback mechanism wages and labour demand	Min. and max wages can influence demand for 'circular' workers
Feedback mechanism between demand and supply	Yearly reassessment of allowed participants
Variable	
Extended programme duration	More rounds possible if successful
Duration of stay (per round)	Days/months/season/years
Supply in sending country/area	(periodic) assessment of labour surplus in sector
Demand in host country/area	(periodic) assessment of labour demand in sector
Maximum wages	To protect local 'host' labour market
Entry and/or participation costs	Necessary investment from participant
Return on investment estimate for participants	Time after which investment is paid off
Average labour cost for employers	'Is it a good deal' for employers
(max) Number of participants (per 'round')	
Minimum number of participants per consecutive rounds	Results from number of workers with re-entry rights
Social security provisions	What happens in case of job related injury?
Pension provisions	Yes or no? Transferable?
Health insurance	Transferable? to what extent?
Permission to bring family?	Yes/no/on longer term?
Estimates	
Costs of options for irregular entry	'Is it a good deal' for migrants
Number of expected vacancies	Labour needs
Expected revenues for host country	Economic (development) effects of fulfilled labour positions
Estimated remittances	Economic (development) effects for home countries

(continued on following page)

Value of knowledge for home countries	Indirect development effect
Social effects in home and host country	Ethical and political viability implications
Are human rights respected?	In short and longer run, and also in relation to 'irregular' alternatives? What's the perspective?

The parameters fall apart in roughly three categories: fixed properties of a programme, variables and (running) estimates. There are many parameters, which give the impression of excessive bureaucracy. First of all, the design of a programme is in itself always a paternalistic endeavour. This position is questionable. Part of this problem is avoided by the introduction of iterative design rounds (trial and error) and the use of variables with feedback mechanisms. The dangers of the paternalist position are increased considering the huge economic and developmental differences. Abuse can easily result from the power discrepancies between sending and receiving countries, resulting in forms of implicitly forced labour; after investment and with high expectations from the investing families migrants are not entirely free to opt out. In other words, migrants should be protected against the state and the power imbalance just like civilians in democratic countries are protected against the inherently powerful state.²⁰²

An important factor for the success or failure from the migrants' perspective is the estimation of costs of irregular entry. This is the ultimate 'deal maker or breaker' for migrants, as they will always have many other options to cross the borders. Increasing border control and control for illegal working practices will at most increase these costs but –as the Bracero–example has shown in chapter 4.3.1– most likely not make these options disappear. Although not transparent there are estimations of these costs, and they can be obtained by simply asking (potential) migrants in interviews.²⁰³

An important balancing property of this scheme is the involvement of migrants in the design process and a number of provisions limiting insecurity. The most important are provisions for re–entry, an eventual permanent citizenship if desired, transferable working permits to prevent exploitation, minimal programme duration and wages, social and health security and pension provisions (potentially transferable upon return), family reunion perspectives, and a general human rights assessment. These provisions are printed bold in Table 12.

Building on the arguments put forward by Oliver Bakewell,²⁰⁴ it can again be questioned why people from poor countries are not granted the same degree of freedom that people in the West see as an achievement, and why this 'conception of the good life' is not strived for in development thinking. Finding no moral justification for this, nor practical arguments on the longer run, the provision of a perspective for

²⁰² In the Netherlands for example this protection is ensured through the 'Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht', see <http://www.justitie.nl/onderwerpen/wetgeving/awb/> (18–12–2009)

²⁰³ See for example the interview with Parfait in Appendix B. Parfait indicated that he paid €400 for a journey from Nouadhibou to the Canary Islands

²⁰⁴ As stated in chapter 3

the freedom to live and settle where one desires should be a corner stone of any just circular migration policy programme. This does not mean that full citizens rights should be granted on first arrival. But a serious perspective on freedom of choice within a time span with a proportional relationship to human life is a prerequisite for policies aiming for development.

A further measure to balance for inherent power discrepancies comes from the question whether the home countries' perspective is included. Where European countries can directly benefit from temporary labour, birth countries can benefit from 'temporary return'. If migrants are denied the right of re-entry after a period in the birth country his or her temporary return is blocked. For balance of reciprocal interests the inclusion of temporary return is helpful, as has been suggested by the British government.²⁰⁵

5.2.3 Test of framework on Dutch pilot programme

The framework developed above is an attempt to provide an answer to the question how CM can promote development. To generally test whether the framework is useful, it will be tried on the Dutch pilot programme discussed in section 5.1. A detailed assessment report can be found as Appendix C. Table 13 provides a quick overview of how the programme holds against the framework.

The results reveal that the pilot misses a 'circular' element because there is only one 'round' so there is no real perspective in terms of free choice. Furthermore it is unclear if and when migrants are consulted. An estimation of costs and revenues for the programme and for illegal alternatives is lacking. For migrants as well as for employers the crucial question whether the endeavour will be profitable is not easily answered, but also the programme is more difficult to 'sell' politically in the receiving country. Lastly, from a moral as well as from a practical perspective social, pension and health provisions will have to be specified or the human rights record of the programme will at least be questionable.

More generally, can the programme be expected to contribute to development? If development is defined along the lines of the *desirable* definition,²⁰⁶ it is questionable. The freedom to move and work is only one time granted, and other than the assertion that the Dutch government will help the migrant finding a job at home upon return, he or she has no real long term perspective. If however the more general politically viable definition of development is used, an economic benefit to the home country would already be considered to be sufficient. Money earned in the Netherlands will be either sent or taken back home, and acquired knowledge can be transferred and put to work as well.

²⁰⁵ As discussed in chapter 4.1

²⁰⁶ As argued in 3.4.

Table 13 – framework applied to Dutch case

Parameters/questions	Values/notes
Fixed	
Parties involved in programme design	HIT, UWV, SA, IN
Are migrants consulted in interviews?	Unknown
Enforcement of return	No
Incentives for return	Learned capabilities
Incentives for default	Unknown
Home country perspective assessed	No
Provisions for re-entry	No
Provisions for permanent citizenship	No
Labour sector specified	Yes
Permit transferable to other employers	Unknown
Can employers ask for specific persons?	No
Organization and administration	HIT
Administration finance	Dutch government
Minimal Programme duration (nr. of 'rounds')	1 round, 2 years
Minimum wages	Unknown
Feedback mechanism wages and labour demand	No
Feedback mechanism between demand and supply	No
Variable	
Extended programme duration	No
Duration of stay (per round)	2 years
Supply in sending country/area	SA: high. IN: unknown
Demand in host country/area	To be assessed
Maximum wages	No
Entry and/or participation costs	Unknown
Return on investment estimate for participants	Unknown
Average labour cost for employers	Unknown
(max) Number of participants (per 'round')	2 x 80
Minimum number of participants per consecutive rounds	n/a
Social security provisions	Unknown
Pension provisions	Unknown
Health insurance	Unknown
Permission to bring family?	No
Estimates	
Costs of options for irregular entry	Unknown
Number of expected vacancies	To be assessed
Expected revenues for host country	Unknown
Estimated remittances	Unknown
Value of knowledge for home countries	Estimated high
Social effects in home and host country	Unknown
Are human rights respected?	Debateable, to be monitored

5.3 The interplay between migration and development

The first and most important effect of migration on development is probably through financial channels; it was the realization that remittances far outreached official development aid that sparked the interest for the migration–development relationship in the first place.²⁰⁷ Other effects of migration for development remain unquantified but are believed to include transfer of knowledge and the formation of international networks facilitating trade.²⁰⁸ Although more information on remittances and how they are invested will become available, the exact relationships between migration and development will always remain uncertain, which given the complex nature of the two processes and their interaction comes to no surprise.

As a result, migration can never be a simple solution to problems of development. As Steven Castles (2007) puts it, the idea of pure remittance-led development seems simplistic and naïve. Broadly-based long-term approaches are needed. The framework developed in this chapter is an attempt at facilitating such approaches. The question remains, does migration increase security and freedom? As the poorest seldom engage in migration,²⁰⁹ circular migrants will not be likely to live on subsistence levels. The freedom they give up for example because of family separation should be outweighed by the financial benefits; a highly subjective decision. If development is freedom, how free is a circular migrant to live the life he or she desires?

The relationship between migration and development can be two-way. “In the short run, international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development but from development itself”.²¹⁰ De Haas (2006a: 90) is sceptical about how migration can contribute to development. He concludes that development needs to go *before* circulation. Temporary migration programmes have a limited effect on development for three reasons; it takes decades before development impacts gain momentum, already integrated and settled migrants remit and invest more, and residency rights or (double) citizenship promote return and circulation. In other words, the conditions of relative underdevelopment are unfavourable for circular migration.

In the African–European context, De Haas following Skeldon (1997) conceptualized the North African region as increasingly being a “labour frontier”²¹¹. Taking the Moroccan case as discussed in 4.3.5, it shows that although transnational ties were cherished, Moroccans in general are “hesitant to invest and do not return”. The picture of remittances and return migration remains ambiguous. “Migration and

²⁰⁷ See 4.1.

²⁰⁸ The House of Commons (2003) report explains there is not enough data.

²⁰⁹ The poorest seldom engage in migration because they do not have the means to move; hence the migration ‘hump’ theory as discussed in 3.2.

²¹⁰ Massey et al.1998: 277

²¹¹ As has been explained in chapter 2.1.3, a labour frontier is an area where labour demand on the one side and unemployment on the other lead to a situation where the area with large labour demand gradually moves from emigration to immigration.

remittances have considerably improved living conditions”²¹², up to a point where “it has been estimated that 1.17 million out of 30 million Moroccans would fall back to absolute poverty without international remittances”²¹³. On the other hand, while migration is a selective process, middle- and higher income groups profit relatively strong from remittances. And while remittances have some effect, circular and return migration, with investments in the home country, are very limited because of a “generally unfavourable investment climate, characterized by inadequate infrastructure and the absence of public services [...], inefficient judiciary and lack of legal security; as well as a general lack of trust in government institutions and doubts about future political and economic stability.”²¹⁴

There is no definitive explanation of the relationship between migration and development. Contributions by migration to development will have to be evaluated on a regular basis, and the reality of policy programmes aiming at strengthening development through migration is that they create at best good chances.

²¹² De Haas 2006a: 87

²¹³ Teto (2001) in De Haas 2006a: 87

²¹⁴ Bencherifa and Popp, 2000; De Haas, 2007a, in De Haas 2006a: 88

Djiby Diop

Diop has lost all he had. Tie-dying fabrics in all colours he had made good money. Until traders from France and Spain told him that he could earn much more if he would sell them himself in Europe.

After selling everything, his TV, his video, he set off for Spain. During a month in the Algerian desert, running from village to village at night, his money had gone really fast. Algerian villagers knew the migrants had no choice but to buy their bread from them – at good prices.

Almost broke, he eventually reached the fences of Melilla, one of the Spanish enclaves in Morocco. Night after night he tries to climb the fences. The day before he would succeed he had only about one Euro left. Praying to God he tried again and got himself into Spain. He ran. He ran for hours. Then he met an old Spanish man, who helped him. He could stay at his house during the man's 15 day apple-picking absence. Diop would wait for the man to help him upon return. Walking the streets of Melilla looking for work, he is caught by police. Three days in prison and a ticket back to Bamako is all he earned in Spain.



For some months now he is in Bamako. But why does not Diop go back to Senegal? When asked, he answers: "I'm not happy to be here. I'm here because of a lack of other possibilities. When you're born in Senegal but try to earn your money in Mali, you do not earn half of what you can get at home. I only stayed here because I met an Italian man who helped me, otherwise I would have left to another African country to earn money to go back to Senegal."

So Diop will easily travel to another African country. But he is only one day travelling away from his home in Dakar. Why does not he go back? Shame is seldom directly talked about. It seems to be an implicit and accepted truth that family and friends will not accept you when you come back empty handed.

6 Conclusions

Before answering the question whether or not circular migration programmes can contribute to development, it is the question itself that must be questioned; the question is often rooted in a neo-colonial notion of development. The rationale found behind the question in contemporary policy making is either implicitly or explicitly that 'development' will eventually lead to a situation where migrants will 'stay home'. This rationale contradicts current ideas about development as freedom and increasing human capabilities. To shed the idea of circular migration from its colonial heritage the goal of 'keeping them at home' will have to be changed into 'enabling human mobility with maximum benefits for all involved.'

General conclusions from an analysis of cases are first that circular migration²¹⁵ as a practice is nothing new. It is more the rule than the exception. The observed change in discourse from migration to mobility fits with this reality. As for example a large number of Moroccan workers in Europe return to their home country on a yearly basis, the great majority of Moroccans are circular migrants without deliberate policies regulating them or labelling them so. Other findings are that data on migration and in particular circular migration between Europe and Africa is mostly lacking, just as there is little research on the relation between regional or national African legal systems and the system of international law. What is known is that "[m]any migrants have no desire to stay permanently, as long as the option of return is open to them".²¹⁶ It has been observed²¹⁷ that closing borders leads to increased permanent settlement as temporal migrant workers lose the possibility of coming back, and thus earning a 'Western' income, once they would leave.

Complex systems theory leads to the uncomfortable conclusion that a causal relationship between 'migration' and 'development' will be impossible to prove. Trial and error for that reason will have to be an integral part of circular migration policy programmes. Programmes have to consist of multiple rounds or iterations with both regular evaluations and built-in feedback loops.²¹⁸

Migrant's agency is structurally missing in migration research. This is problematic because actors' perceptions are the only way to define a system and its parameters. Migration, including circular patterns, has a long and strong tradition in many African societies. It comes therefore as no surprise that (circular) migration is considered and used as an optimization and risk reduction strategy by many people. It should also not come as a surprise that many seek a better future through irregular migration routes. It is important for policy makers and politicians to keep in mind that for migrants, regulated programmes or illegal routes are just two means to the same end, and that illegal migration has a negative moral connotation that is not

²¹⁵ Conceived of as 'repeated temporary labour migration'; see 4.4.1

²¹⁶ Castles 2006: 29

²¹⁷ Most particularly in the US-Mexican case, see 4.3.2

²¹⁸ Feedback like for example between labour demand and number of new participants allowed.

necessarily felt by African people looking at huge socio-economic inequalities. It might be more realistic to not only ask whether migration stimulates development, but also what can be done given the current geo-political situation to facilitate the inevitable want for African people to work abroad.

Starting from actors' perceptions, most importantly the migrants' own, a preliminary assessment frame for a successful programme has been worked out.²¹⁹ To give an impression of the applicability of the frame it has been tested against the case of a new Dutch circular migration programme. Main conclusions are first that the same neo-colonial notion of development seems to lay at the root of the programme. Furthermore it has a too short time frame, it offers no real alternative to irregular routes, offers no strong future perspective, and is before all aimed at 'keeping them at home' in the short as well as the longer term. Because of this it does not fit with the 'desirable' idea of development as worked out in the second chapter. In practical as well as in moral terms the programme seems seriously flawed.

This leads to conclude that perhaps circular migration can stimulate development, but that this is strongly dependent on programme design. Circular migration programmes have proven only to be able to succeed if either border restrictions are limited or programme administration is strict, with low numbers of workers, high return incentives and few irregular opportunities through migrant networks.²²⁰ The main question has been rephrased in the course of the analysis in chapter five, into the more specific "How can policy programmes be designed that help creating circumstances under which a positive contribution can be expected from regulated acts of repeated temporal labour migration to human freedom and security?", with the need for specifications of time and place. An assessment frame as developed can be a starting point for such a design, although the number of interviews on which such a frame should be based must be much higher than that used in this research. The frame provided can for this reason only be considered as a starting point.

Answers to the preliminary question whether circular migration can stimulate development are dependent on the position taken on development. In the rephrased question this position is chosen along the 'desirable' ideas of development. The question whether circular migration can contribute to human freedom and security implies other goals than those regularly found in migration policy. In the cases discussed in chapter four, it is only the Canadian-Mexican programme that would lead to a positive answer because here a long-term perspective is given to the participants, human rights like the right to just working conditions are to some degree ensured, and above all the human right to freedom of movement is ensured to a level that could be seen as the best obtainable under current geo-political

²¹⁹ Although the number of interviews upon which this frame has been based is too low to lead to a representative system description.

²²⁰ This is the general conclusion from the discussion of existing programmes in 4.3.

circumstances. Considering that only one case displays a potential for ‘desirable’ development, circular migration programmes only can be expected to stimulate development if specific conditions are met.

The programme designs in the policy papers discussed in the same chapter²²¹ show a similarly weak picture: only the circular migration ideas written for the British House of Commons display a vision of development that aims at improving human freedom and security for all actors, including migrants, in the shorter and the longer term. It offers the only discourse where circular migrants are not only described as poor people who are temporarily allowed to work in the West, but as both mobile people who can come work in the UK *and* foreign-born UK citizens temporarily working in their countries of birth. This vision provides a balance to the inherited neo-colonial qualities of most other migration programmes.

Another conclusion from the policy paper studies is that possible negative side effects are often omitted. The psychological dimensions of repeated temporary stay abroad, especially away from family, is very seldom researched or used as an argument in policy making. Dependency on programmes can lead to situations resembling forced labour. Politics do play a part, and there seems to be a discrepancy between politically viable time horizons and those needed by processes of development and the systemic changes going with them. More generally, necessary systemic changes and system dynamics like feedback are seldom used in policy design.

A definite explanation of the relationship between circular migration and development is impossible to provide. Especially regarding the complex nature of mobility systems, the best we can get at is a ‘yes, circular migration can stimulate development, but’. The ‘but’ is important and reflected in the assessment framework found in chapter five. This in itself offers policy recommendations. The most important of them will be listed here. If a circular migration programme is to contribute to development, such a programme should:

- start from the perceptions, needs and wants of migrants
- incorporate the interests of all other important actors, like employers
- offer a good ‘deal’ for participants in terms of expected programme benefits versus expected benefits from irregular entry and ‘overstay’²²²
- offer a long-term perspective, with preferably permanent citizenship after years of contribution to a foreign economy when desired
- should not be ended for existing participants (only new entries should be cancelled in case a programme does not prove to be beneficial or politically viable)
- ensure basic human rights regarding working conditions, healthcare, wages, housing, et cetera
- be organized in regularly evaluated periods

²²¹ See 4.1

²²² see 5.2.2

If development is freedom, how free is a circular migrant to live the life he or she desires? Perhaps Western politicians and electorates can not imagine why migrants would want to go back to live in their home countries. Even more important, it is immoral to consider mobility as an asset for the rich and a failure for the poor.²²³ This conclusion has to be reflected in circular migration policies. There are just a few proposals that hold against the standards of Universal Human Rights.²²⁴ There are no policy programmes offering a true long-term perspective.

The author suspects that hope for a better future is the single most important aspect of successful circular migration programmes. As this hope is built on trust, it will be important to design viable programmes with honest perspectives. The Dutch pilot projects in this respect lack perspective, but the fact of their existence can be considered as a first positive step. For Djiby Diop, Mamadou Diallo, Ba, Korotou and Omar Parfait whose widely differing migration stories were told throughout the chapters, such a programme would probably have been just one more option. Many people still die trying other, more dangerous routes, like the 130 people on the boat that Parfait eventually did not embark upon. For the generation of young Africans wishing for a future it must be hoped that circular migration policy programmes will not break their dreams but make them, so that life waits for them behind the horizon.

²²³ See Oliver Bakewell's arguments in chapter 2.

²²⁴ See 2.1.5

7 Appendix A – Terms and definitions

Asylum-seeker	Migrant in the process of being recognized as a refugee.
Cumulative causation	Over time international migration tends to sustain itself in ways that make additional movement progressively more likely, because the social context is altered by the act (Massey 1998: 47).
Dependence	Migrants and their families relying on their foreign jobs and wages (Martin 2003: 1).
Development tiers	Areas of geographical stratification discerned according to differing relative stages of development.
Development	The social and political economic process of societal change in which people's capabilities grow as they desire, with – if actively pursued like in policy making – the goal to provide a fair minimum level of human security. See 3.2.
Distortion	The fact that employers make investment decisions on the assumption that migrants will continue to be available, (Martin 2003: 1).
Illegal/irregular/undocumented migrant:	Person who lives in a country where he has no legal permission to stay. Because considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights no person as such can be illegal and the illegal aspect is only in his or her residence rights, the terms irregular and undocumented migrant are increasingly being used, and will be preferred in this paper.
International Migrant	Persons outside their country of birth or citizenship for 12 months or more (UN International Migration Report 2002). ²²⁵
international migration system:	the whole of actions by and interactions between (networks of) actors perceiving sets of opportunity structures and constraints related to crossing borders between countries for reasons other than short-term visit.
Labour frontier	Development tier with most labour emigration.
Migration	The purposeful act of change of location of a group of persons or an individual, as outcome of a deliberate

²²⁵ Migrants are travellers as they move but not all travellers are migrants, depending on the goal of their journey.

decision of some form by the group or the individual (Maru 2008).

Migration hump A temporary increase in migration that has been a usual part of the process of economic development since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating (Martin and Taylor 1996 in De Haas 2006a: 68).

Migration specific capital: Information and knowledge on location, job opportunities, housing (Constant and Zimmerman 2007: 3) provided through social networks and leading to the process of cumulative causation (Massey et al. 1998: 281).

Migration transition The notion that societies and countries in parallel with economic restructuring and concomitant social change and demographic transitions tend to go through a sequence of initially increasing emigration, the coexistence of significant but diminishing emigration and increasing immigration to eventually become net immigration countries.²²⁶

Mobility The universal human practice of spatial change, in aggregate a complex system of short-term, long-term, short-distance and long-distance movement; the ongoing practice of migration (Skeldon 1997: 2, OECD 2007a: 15).

Refugee Any person, who owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of Race, Religion, Nationality, Membership of a particular Social Group or Political opinion, is outside the country of his Nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country (UN 1951).

Remittances Money sent home by labour migrants.

Repeat migration The act of migrating to the same destination as before.

Transnationality Multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states (Vertovec 1999).

²²⁶ Zelinsky 1971 and Skeldon 1997, in De Haas 2006a: 67

8 Appendix B – Interview Transcripts (Dutch)

8.1 Djiby Diop – textile worker in Bamako, Mali

interview dd 28 February 2009

Mijn naam is Djiby Diop. Ik ben geboren in Dakar, de wijk Geuywaye. Bij een benzinestation [...]. Dat is de woning van de oude president van mali [Moussa Traore, SJ]. Ik woonde in Senegal en ik deed aan verven van kleding. Het werk heb ik heel lang gedaan, het ging zo goed dat ik zelfs een winkel ging openen om m'n eigen werk te verkopen. Mensen kwamen uit Frankrijk en Spanje om geverfde kleding bij mij te kopen en in hun landen weer te verkopen. Als ze kwamen en ze wilden een bepaalde stof, bijvoorbeeld Basin Riche, dan kostte dat 30 à 35.000 CFA. En ze verkochten het dan weer voor 150 à 175.000 CFA. Minder goede kwaliteit... Een basin van mindere kwaliteit verkocht ik voor 12.500 en die werd dan voor 75.000 verkocht. Mensen hebben me verteld als het werk dat ik in Dakar deed in Frankrijk of Spanje zou doen... dan zou ik miljoenen verdienen, dus ik dacht ik wil naar Spanje. Toen dacht ik, ik ga alles verkopen, mijn tv en zo, en toen had ik 1.500.000 CFA.

Naar Bamako gegaan, daarna naar Agades in Niger... daar bleef ik acht dagen... daar heb ik veel mensen uit de Fouta ontmoet, ook Malinesen maar de meesten waren Senegalees. Daar hebben wij brommer-smokkelaars betaald en die hebben ons van Agades naar Algerije gebracht. In de woestijn gingen we hard lopen van plek naar plek en boodschappen doen als we in een dorp waren. Dan kochten we eten en sliepen we. Soms werden we door de bandieten aangevallen op het platteland. Een van mijn compagnons heeft bijna zijn been gebroken onderweg. Toen we Tamarachek passeerden moest hij worden teruggebracht. Die werd naar hier geëvacueerd, het was een Senegalees. De eerste dag na Tamaracheq begonnen de problemen, we kwamen bij een busstation en de eigenaar daarvan zei dat zwarte Afrikanen niet in zijn auto's mochten instappen. We mochten daar dus niet vertrekken, we moesten ons verstoppen in een tuin en bleven daar tot 's avonds. Toen konden we een 'illegale taxi' vinden waarmee we weg konden. Toen wij de hekken bereikten waren we één maand in Algerije geweest. Wij verstoppen ons overdag en iedere dag om acht uur probeerden we over de hekken te klimmen. Iedere keer beproefden wij ons geluk. Op de laatste dag had ik totaal 500CFA in mijn zak. Ik had nog 500 CFA [minder dan €1, SJ] op de laatste dag. Ik bidde tot God wat er zou gebeuren als ik die zou uitgeven. Allah heeft me geholpen dat ik die dag de kans kreeg om op de hekken te klimmen. Toen wij de hekken bereikten waren we één maand in Algerije geweest. In de woestijn gingen we hard lopen van plek naar plek en boodschappen doen als we in een dorp waren.. Ik ging rennen, rennen, rennen, kon nergens een slaapplek vinden, dus ik sliep in de buitenlucht. Ik werd bijna ziek van het rennen. Een oude Spanjaard is degene die mij geholpen heeft. Hij heeft voor mij veel gekocht en heeft me voorgesteld aan iemand bij wie ik mocht blijven. Ik heb aan die man verteld dat ik kleding verf. Ik zij dat ik kleding verfde en dat ik zou kunnen werken als ik ergens een plaats zou vinden. Maar ik wil geen ander werk

gaan doen. De man zei dat is geen probleem want hij moest naar het platteland. Hij ging 15 dagen lang appels plukken. Als de man terug zou komen zouden wij al met mensen hebben gepraat en ik zou mijn eigen werk dan kunnen doen, dat is niet te zwaar. Hij zei dat is goed maar ondanks dat je alles mij gegeven hebt kan ik niet 15 dagen niets doen. Ik ga kijken of ik iets kan doen. De man zei dat is geen probleem, en ik ging iedere keer weg van huis op zoek naar werk.

Zo ben ik politie tegengekomen en die hebben mij aangehouden. Ze hebben mij drie dagen vastgehouden... en ze hebben mij teruggestuurd naar Bamako. Sinds ik terug ben in Bamako kan je je niet voorstellen welke problemen ik heb gehad. Welke problemen hebben jullie gehad voordat je Spanje bereikte? Over het eten gesproken, we hebben echt honger gehad. Overal. Eigenlijk is het lijden begonnen nadat we Agades hadden verlaten. In Agades verbleven we in een huis van een Malinees die acht jaar daar verblijft. [bedoelt: al acht jaar wacht om naar europa te komen, SJ]. Dat was iemand die in Gabon verbleef en die wilde naar Spanje. Hij kwam naar Agades en is alles kwijtgeraakt. Hij is nu bewaker. Bijna alle Senegalesen en Malinesen die onderweg zijn verblijven bij hem. Hij stelt mensen voor aan brommer-eigenaren. Deze smokkelaars brengen je tot de grens en vanaf daar moet je lopen. Geen eten, geen drinken. Voordat we Bamako verlaten kopen we riemen en daarin verstop je het geld. Er zijn ook mensen die brood kopen en het vlees van het brood eruit halen en er geld in proppen. Dat dan in een plastic tasje is je enige bagage. Dit doen we omdat als de bandieten ons aanvallen, geen geld of bagage zien, dan vertrekken ze. Als de bandieten geld vinden bij één van de groep dan houden ze de hele groep tegen. Om aan eten te komen met dertien mensen, naderden we een dorpje en verstopten we ons. De dapperste van ons ging naar het dorp op zoek naar eten. Diegene ging dan brood kopen. Ze hebben daar van die ronde broodjes. Als we nu niet eten, eten we de volgende dag pas. En niemand kan zeggen ik heb honger en ga nu eten. Zo ging het totdat we in Marokko kwamen. In Tamarachek moesten we echt lijden want een van ons was ziek. Daar huurden we hotelkamers. Dat hebben mensen aan de politie verteld, die hebben het hotel in bezit genomen. De politie heeft ons weggejaagd en niemand van ons heeft een cent teruggekregen. Sommigen van ons werden opgepakt. Ik werd ook opgepakt. Ze zeiden jullie proberen naar Spanje te gaan. Ik zeg dat was niet waar ik was in Gabon en kwam een familielid ophalen dat onderweg was. Ik zei tegen hen: ik slaap hier in dit hotel en morgen zal ik vertrekken. Dat kon ik laten zien want ik had een visum voor Gabon in mijn paspoort. Politieagenten hadden vertrouwen in mij, ze lieten me gaan en ik ben een paar van mijn compagnons gevolgd. Toen ik ze zag zei ik ze: we moeten Tamarachek links laten liggen anders komen we echt in de problemen. Een van mijn compagnons die 450.000CFA bij zich had heeft besloten om niet verder te gaan. Dat geld werd allemaal afgepakt. Dat was Aziz. Dat is iemand uit Keur Massar in Dakar, Senegal. Daar heb ik hem leren kennen. Van die 450.000 heeft hij niets meer over. Dus een van de mensen uit Fouta zei omdat alles van hem is afgenomen moeten we wat we hebben met hem delen en verder gaan. Over het eten gesproken, wij gingen allemaal

eten kopen. Wie geld had kon eten kopen maar wie geen geld had at ook mee. Als er eten was, tenminste. Aan eten komen dat was het grote probleem. Omdat er overal bandieten waren en als je zo'n groep was tegengekomen was het erg moeilijk ze weer kwijt te raken. Je kon gedood worden, gewond raken. Zo ging het verder tot we in Algerije kwamen. Daar was het nog erger. Eén broodje kost 150, in Algerije kost het 400 tot 450, drie keer zo veel. De regel was simpel: als je wilt koop je, als je niet wilt dan niet. Maar je zit in no mans' land als je niet koopt ga je dood van de honger. Drinken was geen probleem want er was daar heel veel water. Wij konden water gaan halen en drinken. Dus mensen van het Rode Kruis waren ook daar actief. Dus die mensen zaten vaak in helicopters en gooiden eten naar ons toe. Om te kunnen overleven gingen wij gaten maken om het gedropte eten te verstoppen.

Dus als de Arabieren wisten dat wij eten hadden gingen ze het eten afpakken en moesten we van hen eten kopen. Dat was dan heel duur. Want ze weten dat we in een vreemd land zijn en kunnen ons eten gewoon meenemen. Als je iets maar zegt wordt je afgemaakt. Niemand zei wat. Wij hebben daar moeten lijden. Er waren mensen zo ernstig ziek dat we vreesden dat zij dood gingen. Als het zover was dat iemand ziek was gingen wij contributie betalen, de een 50.000, de ander 60.000, om die terug te laten keren, te repatriëren. Zo zijn veel mensen teruggegaan. Van de 13 zijn er maar 8 mensen doorgedaan. Dus toen we daar arriveerden zaten daar meer dan 40 mensen nog. Degenen die uit dezelfde landen kwamen vormden een groep. Dus als je niet uit hetzelfde land kwam kon je twee dagen met die mensen zijn zonder te eten. We zijn daar een maand geweest en dankzij God zijn we verder gegaan. Het echte lijden, van a tot z, we hebben het allemaal meegemaakt. Voor de duidelijkheid niemand van ons kan beweren dat hij na Agades iedere dag aan eten en drinken was gekomen. Dat is niet waar. Soms was je twee of drie dagen zonder eten. Je was zo zwak dat je niet eens met de mensen kon praten. Eigenlijk heb ik onderweg heel veel moeten lijden. Sinds ik vertrokken ben uit Spanje en hier in Bamako ben beland... nu ben ik bijna drie maanden in Bamako. Toen ik naar Spanje ging ben ik al mijn geld kwijtgeraakt. Ik heb niks meer, doe wel alles om in leven te blijven. Als ik kan werken doe ik het graag. Ik werk wel maar dat is weinig, niet te vergelijken met wat ik deed in Dakar. Daar was ik ondernemer nu moet ik bedelen om werk. In Dakar was ik ondernemer, ik had twee werknemers en die betaalde ik ook. Dus mensen kwamen ook uit het buitenland op bezoek bij mij. Ze kochten stoffen van mij. Dat brachten ze naar Frankrijk en Spanje en verkochten ze daar. Nu zit ik in Mali en ik hoop dat Allah mij gaat helpen zodat ik aan middelen kan komen zodat ik weer voor mijzelf kan werken. Dat zijn mijn doelen. Ik probeer aan de middelen te komen, maar sinds ik hier ben heb ik al een maand stilgezeten. Gedurende die maand krijg ik eten en drinken en slaapplekken van anderen. Dat heb ik sinds ik geboren ben nooit meegemaakt. Ik ben gewend om te werken en andere mensen te onderhouden, maar deze maand was het andersom. Totdat ik aan die kleine klusjes kwam. Wat je krijgt is wat je kunt doen. Ik vind dit werk niks, ik ben gewend om te werken en zou zelf aan het geld willen komen om voor mezelf te

werken. Dit is allemaal veroorzaakt door de reis, maar eerlijk gezegd heb ik daar spijt van want ik ben al mijn bezit kwijtgeraakt. Gelukkig ben ik een Italiaan tegengekomen die me veel advies gaf. Zo ben ik bij het bedrijfje van ATT gekomen. het naaiatelier van de zoon van de president. Nu gaat het beter. Zodat ik iets kan krijgen zodat ik terug kan gaan. Ik ben niet blij dat ik hier ben. Ik ben hier vanwege gebrek aan andere mogelijkheden. Als je geboren en getogen bent in Senegal en daar verdient, dan kan je nog niet de helft verdienen hier in Mali. Als je ziet dat ik hier langer ben gebleven, dat was vanwege die Italiaan, anders was ik op zoek gegaan naar een ander Afrikaans land om geld te verdienen om terug te gaan naar Senegal. Ik wil voor mezelf gaan werken. Als mijn situatie beter wordt dan wil ik teruggaan. Wat zou je willen doen? Als ik nu in staat zou zijn te beschikken over alle middelen die ik nodig heb zou ik mijn spullen terugkopen en naar huis gaan. Als ik terug zou komen en me zou kunnen hervestigen en te werken dat zou perfect zijn.

8.2 Omar Parfait – construction engineer in Nouadhibou

Interview dd. 18 February 2009

Er waren... dolfijnen die het bootje begeleidden. De eerste keer dat ik de boot nam... Mijn gevoel was... het zal lukken. Je denkt niet aan mislukken. Je denkt niet aan de risico's. Je denkt alleen maar dat het lukt. Zelfs als je bang bent. Maar je bent het al aangegaan. We spraken over barsakh of Barcelona... Sterven, of naar Europa, dat was het devies. Toen ik vertrok uit Kameroen nam ik dit boekje mee. Dit is een foto van de tweede. Mijn vrouw heeft hem me gestuurd, met DHL. In 2007. Op deze foto uit Kameroen sta ik met mijn vader en moeder... mijn vader en moeder... en een van mijn kleine zusjes. Net na m'n communie, 2004 in Kameroen. Hier ben ik met mijn vrouw en kinderen, op 25 december 2004. Toen ik uit Kameroen vertrok heb ik dit meegenomen. Kijk, Kameroen – Chad... Kameroen – Legus, in Nigeria. Legus – Cotonou in Benin... Cotonou – Abidjan, per vliegtuig. Daarna Abidjan – Bamako. Daarna Bamako – Algerije. Waar ik werd opgepakt... dus met het vliegtuig terug naar Bamako. Daarna Bamako – Mauritanië. Eerst Nouakchott, toen Nouadhibou. Daarna wilde ik met de boot naar Spanje. met een boot naar Spanje... Dat was de hoop die ik had toen ik hier kwam. De boot naar Spanje, naar Europa. Dat was mijn hoop. Ik kwam op 11 november 2005 aan in Mauritanië. Ik kwam via via in contact met een netwerk... een nieuw netwerk van mensensmokkelaars. Op 28 april 2007 deed ik mijn eerste poging. De eerste poging per boot. Ik betaalde 400 euro, maar... Alles was voorbereid, alles was klaar voor vertrek... We kregen problemen daar... met de Mauritaanse marine – zij deden hun werk goed... We zijn onderschept... en teruggekeerd. In december 2007... deed ik weer een poging. Maar ik heb eisen gesteld. Ik geef de helft nu en de andere helft bij aankomst. Ik heb betaald en alles geregeld wat nodig was. Maar kreeg toen een telefoontje uit Kameroen. Het was mijn vader die me belde. Hij zei: de route die je wilt nemen is niet de juiste! Ik heb met hem gepraat, gezegd: ik moet reizen... Maar hij zei me: dat is niet de weg. In de

media had hij de mensen gezien die... Hij belde me 's ochtends en ik begreep dat God hem een teken had gegeven. Ik heb het daardoor toen niet gedaan, maar... degenen die wel zijn gegaan zijn verdwenen. 130 mensen zijn verdwenen, niemand is aangekomen. Het was echt een catastrofe. In Afrika zeggen we, de ziekte kan je wel verbergen... Maar de dood is niet te ontkennen. Dat wil zeggen, als je ziek bent... je schaamt je omdat je bang bent dat het ontdekt wordt. Maar wanneer men beslist, en veel mensen ervan op de hoogte zijn... dat is hetzelfde als wanneer men zegt... één huis heeft één deur... maar in het huis telt men meerdere bedden. Eén huis heeft één deur, maar in het huis zijn vele bedden. Zo is het ongeveer.

8.3 Korotou Diallo – cleaner in Paris

interview dd. 3 February 2009

Mijn leven is veranderd. Want toen ik daar was was ik nog erg jong. Toen ik 15 was ben ik er getrouwd. Dus ik ken niet veel dingen... de verschillen... ik weet niet goed hoe ik dit moet uitleggen. Voordat ik hier kwam ging ik naar school. Na school ben ik getrouwd. Daarna ben ik hierheen gekomen, in 1980. Toen heb ik kinderen gekregen... en daarna ben ik gaan werken. Horeca, als gemeentelijk medewerker... een beetje van alles. Daarna ben ik schoonmaakster geworden. Dat doe ik nu nog. Daarna breng ik de kinderen naar school... Ik doe het huishouden, de boodschappen... Ik wenste toen ik naar Frankrijk kwam... dat ik er zou kunnen werken, de familie steunen... dat ik thuis een huis voor mijn kinderen zou kunnen bouwen, voor de toekomst. En zaken zou kunnen doen, of soortgelijke plannen realiseren. Dat heb ik altijd in gedachten gehad. Dus godzijdank heb ik gevochten toen ik hier kwam... voor... ik heb mijn verblijfspapieren via mijn man gekregen. Dus ik kon gaan werken... de familie helpen, een beetje van alles eigenlijk. Elk jaar ga ik terug naar mijn land om mijn familie te zien. Waar voelt u zich het meeste thuis, hier of in Bamako? – In Bamako. Waarom? – Omdat ik van mijn land hou. Ik hou van mijn land en bovendien voel ik daar dat ik bij de familie hoor. En vanwege de sfeer hebben we er veel minder zorgen dan hier. Hier is men heel vaak tussen vier muren. Je moet hier belasting betalen, huur, andere dingen... Alles wat men hier verdient gaat naar de staat. Daar, ook al heb je maar een beetje, je bent vrij. Dus ik verkies Mali. Daar ligt mijn hart. Als ik daar de middelen had gehad die ik nu hier heb... Was ik daar gebleven. En de toekomst van uw kinderen? Ja, ik ga naar school! Wij zijn Afrikanen... en dat voelen we in heel Afrika... in goede en in slechte tijden... willen wij met de familie zijn. Veel mensen verkiezen om, als ze rijk zijn in hun geboorteland... om daar te blijven met de familie. Om daar een leven uit te bouwen. Dat is het.

8.4 Mamadou Diallo – crop harvester in Almería, Spain

Interview dd. 10 February 2009

Mijn naam is Mamadou Diallo... Ik kom uit Senegal, uit de plaats Thiracak. Ik ben 27 jaar. Ik werk in de kassen, met tomaten, pompoenen, kalebassen. Dat is mijn werk in Spanje. Als je niet beschikt over een fiets kan je niet werken. Want alles waar je heen moet is ver weg, zonder fiets ben je niet mobiel. Soms moet je vijf, soms tien kilometer fietsen op zoek naar werk. Je moet fietsen tot je moe bent en werk hebt, dat is de essentie. Als de werkgevers komen met de auto stoppen ze en kijken ze of ze iemand kunnen vinden. Als ze je kunnen gebruiken nemen ze je mee. Als je werk zoekt moet je vroeg wakker worden, je fiets pakken en de straat op. Als je daar staat dan komen ze langs en vragen... Kan je tomaten plukken? Kan je dit? Kan je dat? Zo gaat het hier. Als je geen werk hebt ga je constant op zoek of als je vrienden hebt deel je alles. Om vijf uur sta je op om werk te zoeken. Zo gaat het hier. Als je werkt verdien je hier aan het eind van de maand 800 tot 1200 Euro. Een deel stuur je op naar je familie. Naar je ouders maar ook als je getrouwd bent naar je vrouw en kinderen. Als je werkt zijn veel mensen afhankelijk van het geld dat jij stuurt. Daarvoor ga je naar Western Union, hier heb je veel van dat soort kantoren. Hier woon ik. En hier slaap ik. Ik slaap hier. Hier woon ik. Als ik heb geslapen ga ik zo naar buiten. Hier in Spanje zijn veel migranten. Waar wij nu zijn zijn de meesten uit Mali en Senegal. Hier gebeurt het dat een huisgenoot de huur niet kan betalen en hij eruit wordt gegooid. Als je niet werkt heb je geen eten en drinken. Dan kan je nergens slapen. In Afrika is het tegenovergesteld. Heb je niks dan is er altijd iemand die je helpt. Hier werkt iedereen voor zichzelf. Dat heb je hier. Waar ik vandaan kom heb je Spaanse mensen, Italianen, die daar zonder problemen werken. Veel blanken die kippen en varkens kopen en verkopen, hebben geen probleem. De hotels worden gerund door blanken. Zij hebben daar meer macht en erkenning dan Afrikanen hier. Omdat blanken niet weten wat solidariteit betekent en Afrikanen wel. Ik had onbeschrijflijk veel verwachtingen van Europa. In Afrika had men het altijd over 'Europe Europe Europe' en ik dacht als ik daar kom word ik rijk. Dat is nog steeds mijn hoop. Ik heb altijd gehoopt rijk te worden en terug te gaan om in Afrika te investeren. Een huis bouwen, een familie stichten, alles doen wat ik zou willen doen. Dat was mijn gedachte. Als ik eenmaal geld zou hebben... Dan zou ik teruggaan naar Afrika en nooit terugkomen naar Europa. Daar een zaak starten en mensen in dienst nemen zodat die ook kunnen overleven.

8.5 Mr. Ba – Koran teacher, looking for work in France

Interview dd. 4 February 2009 (partially translated from Woloff)

Zo gaat het in de foyers, ook al ken je niemand... je zoekt tot je iemand vindt die je kan begrijpen. Ik ben via Kaedi, Rosso en Nouakchott... en via Tunesië hier naar Parijs gekomen. Ik kende iemand uit Mauritanië, een oom van Ly, hij is nu

overleden... zijn naam was Sal, hij woonde hier, en via hem wist ik dat Ly hier zat. Ik ben net hier... ik heb nog geen idee wat ik precies ga doen. Ik was zenuwachtig, maar nu ik een bekende heb ontmoet... weet ik dat ik in goede handen ben. Wat wij kunnen betekenen is... hem hier ontvangen... en hem daarna in contact brengen met hulporganisaties. Dacht u dat het leven hier zo zou zijn als het nu is... Heeft u kinderen? – Ja ik heb twee kinderen. Een jongen en een meisje... een is vijf, de ander zeven. Het is moeilijk ze alleen te laten, maar wel noodzakelijk. Het is echt een verplichting. Als je bij je familie bent en je kunt niets voor ze betekenen... dat is erger dan vertrekken. De familie vindt het moeilijk dat ik wegga... maar ik heb geen alternatief. Ik heb niet op school gezeten, heb geen diploma's... kan niet aan een baan komen. Ik vind het moeilijk iedereen achter te laten... maar moet wel weg. Het is niet zo dat je ze één seconde kunt vergeten.

8.6 Abdoulaye Konate, directeur-régisseur CIGEM

Interview in Bamako, Mali, dd. 27 February 2009 (partially translated from French)

Waarom is het centrum opgericht?

Waarom het centrum is opgericht, dan moet ik eerst vermelden, dat het centrum een gezamenlijk initiatief is van de Malinese regering, de Europese Unie, de Afrikaanse Unie, en ook van Frankrijk en Spanje. Om een algemeen benadering op de kaart te zetten, voor duurzame oplossingen voor migratieproblemen, en wat bestaat uit, het zoeken naar oplossingen voor... en daar trouw aan blijft. De vragen rond migratie en werk, dat zijn de hoofdzaken, en de vragen rond ontwikkeling. Dus ziet u, het CIGEM, kiest een algemene aanpak van het migratieprobleem.

Hoeveel mensen heeft uw centrum aan een baan geholpen?

Vandaag de dag hebben we zes mensen plaatselijk, zes migranten, en er zijn zes kandidaten die naar Spanje gaan, om in de landbouwsector te werken, als arbeiders, telers, voor zes maanden in Spanje. En vergeet niet, nogmaals, het centrum is pas geopend op zes oktober.

Vindt u dat de Europese landen hun verantwoordelijkheid nemen op het gebied van werk? Bieden de Europese landen genoeg arbeidsplaatsen aan?

Tsja. Weet u, elke keer als men het over arbeidsproblemen heeft, praat men over de markt, behoeften van de markt, over profielen die vandaag de dag gezocht worden op de nationale en internationale markten.

9 Appendix C – Dutch Pilot programme Assessment

9.1.1 Fixed parameters

Parties involved in the programme design are the HIT foundation, the social security organization UWV for labour market research, and South African and Indonesian government organizations. It is unknown whether potential migrants were or will be interviewed before the pilot begins.

There is no enforcement of return. Incentives for return are sought in individual coaching and the idea that acquired knowledge will be highly valuable in the birth countries. (Undesired) incentives for default have not been mentioned.

Provisions for re-entry are not made. This means that the pilot in fact is temporal and not circular. It provides an incentive to default and overstay. Provisions for permanent settlement are lacking as well.

The labour sectors are specified and are monitored. This provides for feedback in the created system.

Permits do not seem to be transferable to other employers.

Employers can not ask for specific persons; only one 'round' is specified as the pilot consists of a one time temporary stay.

The organization and administration rests with a third organization. It is unknown to what extent either migrants or employers are involved. The administration seems to be financed through government support totalling €3,8 million.

The programme duration is only one round. The perspective for the migrant after return is therefore limited: he or she stays in principle in his or her country with no second chance of moving to the Netherlands.

Minimum wages are unknown but expected to equal Dutch minimum wages. There is no sign of a feedback mechanism between wages and migrant labour demand. As there is only one 'round' there is no feedback between demand and supply of workers either.

9.1.2 Variable parameters

There is no mention of extending the programme's duration.

The duration per stay is a maximum of two years.

The 'supply' in South Africa is said to be 'high';²²⁷ the supply in Indonesia is not quantitatively stated; the country is selected based on its return policies.

The demand in the host country is periodically assessed.

There are no maximum wages.

Entry and participation costs are unknown. It is suspected that participants pay for their own visa and travelling expenses. This will differ for both countries of birth. There does not seem to be an estimate of their return on investment.

²²⁷ Tweede Kamer 2009–2010, 30573, nr. 52

There is no estimation of the costs of irregular entry. It can not be assessed whether it is a 'good deal' for the participants.

There is no trace of a labour cost estimate for employers.

The maximum number of participants is 80 per country.

Social security, pensions and health insurance are not discussed.

Migrants are not permitted to bring their families.

9.1.3 Estimates

The labour needs are assessed but not specified as yet.

There is no estimate of expected revenues for the Dutch economy.

There is no estimate of expected remittances.

The value of knowledge for the countries of birth is estimated, and expected to be very high. High enough to create chances so good that the participants will return voluntarily.

Social effects in the home and host countries are not specified.

The human rights record of the pilot is hard to analyse, because there is not enough information. There are problems to be expected at least with article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Are workers protected against unemployment? Can they join trade unions, not only in theory but also in practice? Should they be encouraged to form for example an association of circular migrants, under the wings of an existing union? Considering the inherent economic and legal differences and resulting power discrepancies between the migrants involved and the state of the Netherlands this is perhaps not as ridiculous as it may sound to some.

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A list of sources sorted to subject and partly with hyperlinks to online sources is available at: <http://www.svenjense.com/thesis/index.php?title=Sources>.

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